Deleuze and Guattari say that philosophy is the creation of concepts on a plane of immanence. They see philosophy as on a distinct and equal playing field from science and art, but I see the philosophical process as more basic and reject the notion of absolute immanence. The point that Dr. J made in class about the transcendence of other people was a good one. An interaction with some sort of transcendence is an everyday thing. I set up a relationship between science, philosophy, and religion, making a place for transcendence. In my meta-paper, I suggest that philosophy is the human attempt to understand the world through reason. But one cannot live on reason alone. Reason can show us the world, but it cannot get inside of it. As a child, I was fascinated by opening and closing the refrigerator door. I would open the door and the light would come on. I would close the door and the light would turn off. I always tried to catch a glimpse of the darkened inside of the refrigerator when I closed the door, but I never could, because the door was in the way, and my angle of vision could never get beyond it. Even if the light went out, it wouldn’t be the same as seeing the inside of the refrigerator with the door closed, clear plastic and cold and darkness. Science is the same. It can take things apart, but it can never get inside of them. We can analyze the brain, but we can never be another person. We must take the leap of faith to climb the mountain of transcendence. This is what religion does. Religion transcends the rational bumping up against things and gets inside of them. It seeks a direct communication with fundamental reality. We trust that we know now what lies behind the door. Science lies alongside philosophy, but religion subsumes it.
Sunday, March 20, 2011
Saturday, March 12, 2011
Deleuze and Guattari
Although Deleuze and Guattari present an organized and detailed description of the relationship between the three forms of thought—philosophy, science, and art—a number of questions stem from their characterization of philosophy. According to Deleuze and Guattari, philosophy in its “purest” form is not influenced by the activities that dominate the social arena; contemplation, reflection, and communication are unable to assist the philosopher as (s)he attempts to create the concept. In addition to the philosopher’s detachment from other individuals, Deleuze and Guattari explain that the creation of the concept is a single event that cannot be replicated. Similarly, the plane of immanence, which develops out of an individual’s knowledge of particular concepts and the culmination of his/her own experiences, is specific to each individual. If philosophy requires such independence and is unable to provide consistent events and planes of immanence, how can philosophy contain any amount of objective truth? Deleuze and Guattari explain that only science is concerned with the value of claims and propositions; philosophy searches for solutions to problems, rather than the truth. Should an individual then approach the chaos as a scientist, or would it be more beneficial to search for solutions to the problems that plague society? This description of philosophy directly contrasts with the accurate notion concerning philosophy’s relation to truth: the individuals who participate in philosophy are eventually exposed to objective truth.
The description of the concept that Deleuze and Guattari provide also stimulates a number of questions. After an individual has placed himself in such a position so that the concept is able to “reveal” itself, it is still unclear whether or not (s)he will become the means for the creation of a particular concept. Potentially, an individual could satisfy all of the necessary “requirements” for the creation of a concept without a concept coming even remotely close enough for the individual to grasp. In addition to this problem, the window of opportunity that the individual has to create a concept is limited. Deleuze and Guattari explain that the concept (as a “layer” of the brain subject) is incredibly fragile. Old age creates objective disconnections and disintegrations that prevent individuals from maintaining the infinite speeds of the chaos. Eventually, the concepts that the individual has accumulated throughout his/her lifetime will begin to disintegrate into separate components. Individuals who are near the end of their lives slowly move back into the chaos outside of the plane of immanence and are forced to rely on ready-made opinion (214). Deleuze and Guattari explain that philosophy only comes together in “the moment of grace between life and death” (1). Hence, the philosopher must struggle not only with opinion and chaos, but also with time. How can the individual who aspires to become a philosopher remain optimistic when faced with such an intimidating challenge? Philosophy, then, must be a mode of thought that is available to the individual regardless of his/her specific age.
The description of the concept that Deleuze and Guattari provide also stimulates a number of questions. After an individual has placed himself in such a position so that the concept is able to “reveal” itself, it is still unclear whether or not (s)he will become the means for the creation of a particular concept. Potentially, an individual could satisfy all of the necessary “requirements” for the creation of a concept without a concept coming even remotely close enough for the individual to grasp. In addition to this problem, the window of opportunity that the individual has to create a concept is limited. Deleuze and Guattari explain that the concept (as a “layer” of the brain subject) is incredibly fragile. Old age creates objective disconnections and disintegrations that prevent individuals from maintaining the infinite speeds of the chaos. Eventually, the concepts that the individual has accumulated throughout his/her lifetime will begin to disintegrate into separate components. Individuals who are near the end of their lives slowly move back into the chaos outside of the plane of immanence and are forced to rely on ready-made opinion (214). Deleuze and Guattari explain that philosophy only comes together in “the moment of grace between life and death” (1). Hence, the philosopher must struggle not only with opinion and chaos, but also with time. How can the individual who aspires to become a philosopher remain optimistic when faced with such an intimidating challenge? Philosophy, then, must be a mode of thought that is available to the individual regardless of his/her specific age.
Philosophies goal should be the pursuit of Logical prospects
Shouldn’t the final goal of philosophy be the formation of opinions. D&G argue that opinions are the enemies of thinking because it does not allow for variation needed for thinking. However once a concept has been thoroughly tested why is it so wrong to try and formulate an opinion. The original idea of philosophy was to find the ideal of truth. Plato’s cave was telling people to find the absolute truth. After escaping the cave the person who saw the truth would try to communicate it with those still stuck in the cave. Granted the people in the cave would not believe him but regardless. The goal of philosophy was to find an absolute truth, one that required no further contemplation. So why can’t one form an opinion? Why can’t one form a concept into a prospect? If one can create a cohesive functional system to shield against the chaos it would seem that they had fulfilled the role of philosophy. At a certain point it seems pointless to continue to contemplate certain philosophical ideas. You would form a logical concept at a certain point so you can contemplate some other philosophical ideal. If the beginnings of philosophy were the pursuit of truth, you cannot make a truth statement if you leave things open ended. The goal of philosophy should be the creation of a set of logical statements that work in a cohesive statement. It should continue to be a pursuit of an absolute truth, or at the very least a truth that shield one from the chaos.
In addition I have a problem with the conceptual personae. It does not seem logical for the character to be completely autonomous. Even Descartes was able to stop the idiot from doubting away everything. The idiot’s goal was to doubt everything. However Descartes was able to prevent the Idiot from doubting away what thinking was, he was able to hang on to opinions that the CP was unable to penetrate. Descartes was able to hang on to conceptions of God and other things to escape his solipsistic hole. The fact that the philosopher could create boundaries makes the cp more of a tool than an autonomous agent. Cp don’t usually take the philosopher just anywhere they are usually at least partially bound by the philosophers already prevalent beliefs. This is why Hegel did not differ that much from Kant, James did not differ that much from Pierce. The conceptual Personae is bound by opinions, thoughts, and beliefs already present in the philosopher. Because of this we do not usually see radical change in philosophic thought all the time. Philosophy usually just builds on top of previous philosophies. There are cases of radical change in philosophy however those cases are rare. I could argue that the philosophers who do cause radical change only do so because they may have experienced something that makes that philosophy inconsistent with some ideas they already hold. So they attempt to create a brand new system. It is like how religion and the idea of God often influence whether or not a philosopher will buy into certain systems.
In addition I have a problem with the conceptual personae. It does not seem logical for the character to be completely autonomous. Even Descartes was able to stop the idiot from doubting away everything. The idiot’s goal was to doubt everything. However Descartes was able to prevent the Idiot from doubting away what thinking was, he was able to hang on to opinions that the CP was unable to penetrate. Descartes was able to hang on to conceptions of God and other things to escape his solipsistic hole. The fact that the philosopher could create boundaries makes the cp more of a tool than an autonomous agent. Cp don’t usually take the philosopher just anywhere they are usually at least partially bound by the philosophers already prevalent beliefs. This is why Hegel did not differ that much from Kant, James did not differ that much from Pierce. The conceptual Personae is bound by opinions, thoughts, and beliefs already present in the philosopher. Because of this we do not usually see radical change in philosophic thought all the time. Philosophy usually just builds on top of previous philosophies. There are cases of radical change in philosophy however those cases are rare. I could argue that the philosophers who do cause radical change only do so because they may have experienced something that makes that philosophy inconsistent with some ideas they already hold. So they attempt to create a brand new system. It is like how religion and the idea of God often influence whether or not a philosopher will buy into certain systems.
Saturday, March 5, 2011
appropriation as a facet of becoming in art
Deleuze and Guatarri begin their chapter on art, percept, affect and concept, with a characterization of an artwork frozen in time, independent of "whoever was breathing that day." If philosophy moves at infinite speed and science is a slowing down as to fix points of reference, then art "preserves and is preserved." This preservation is dependent upon the autonomy of the work of art which is made possible only by the viewer who "only experience [the work of art] after." But what is actually preserved is not what one has seen but rather "a bloc of sensations, that is to say, a compound of percepts and affects." The work of art not only instantiates an aesthetic encounter, but offers up an experience that holds long after the encounter has passed. While D & G do not give an account of what makes for good or bad art, in order to properly be identified as artwork, it would have to accomplish this task of preservation.
Thus, the work of art is contingent upon it's physical existence insofar as it is the vehicle by which one may look at and with the artwork. What has happened to the viewer then, is not merely an experience marginalized by it's duration but rather a kind of reminiscence posited by the mind. The combination of the physical thing (whether that be music, visual art, literature or otherwise) with one's aesthetic understanding of the natural world combined with the dramatic intention of the artist will hopefully yield a work that is "a being sensation and nothing else" existing in and of itself. It is the task of the viewer then to further appropriate their feelings about the art encountered in order to create lasting impressions, in a way, feelings that can be conjured in the mind without the presence of the work of art itself. These feelings are called affects and percepts as they are in a way derivative of the visceral affections and perceptions felt upon viewing.
Thus, the task of the work of art both to participate and instantiate a process of appropriation. this appropriation could be of objects, methods, components, feelings, techniques or ideas; but it seems to me that D & G are hinting at a kind territorializing and deterritorializing in order to make the work of art stand alone, in and of itself. This explanation seems to be a surrogate for "appropriation" which, I believe, is inherent to the creative process.
Thus, the work of art is contingent upon it's physical existence insofar as it is the vehicle by which one may look at and with the artwork. What has happened to the viewer then, is not merely an experience marginalized by it's duration but rather a kind of reminiscence posited by the mind. The combination of the physical thing (whether that be music, visual art, literature or otherwise) with one's aesthetic understanding of the natural world combined with the dramatic intention of the artist will hopefully yield a work that is "a being sensation and nothing else" existing in and of itself. It is the task of the viewer then to further appropriate their feelings about the art encountered in order to create lasting impressions, in a way, feelings that can be conjured in the mind without the presence of the work of art itself. These feelings are called affects and percepts as they are in a way derivative of the visceral affections and perceptions felt upon viewing.
Thus, the task of the work of art both to participate and instantiate a process of appropriation. this appropriation could be of objects, methods, components, feelings, techniques or ideas; but it seems to me that D & G are hinting at a kind territorializing and deterritorializing in order to make the work of art stand alone, in and of itself. This explanation seems to be a surrogate for "appropriation" which, I believe, is inherent to the creative process.
Paris Je T'aime
Upon reading chapter 7 of What is Philosophy I must say that D&G’s discussion of art is in many regards more fulfilling than even their previous chapters on philosophy and science. While philosophy and science helps “reconceptualize” our understanding of concepts and functions, art helps make sense of human emotion/sensation through the lens of percepts and affects. It is interesting to me how D&G seem to devote closer attention to the subject of art in particular than they do P&S.
Now, obviously they spend more time in the text tackling the differences between philosophy and science, so what I mean to say is how the definition and explication of art that they impart the reader is one that is highly refined. Perhaps it’s the nature of the apparent bias (and I don’t use this word in a pejorative sense) the French have towards art that inspired the rich content of D&G’s own understanding of art. Consequently, I’m more inclined to think of D&G as authorities on art more so than philosophy (all doctorates and publications aside). I mean, lets face it, Memphis is not Paris; and neither is New York City (sorry Kip and Ben), so it makes sense how D&G conception of art is almost inextricable from their own upbringing.
If you think about it, Paris is one of the few cities in the world that is simply exudes art. It leaves one feeling the rawness of human passion and emotion, incomparable to that of any other place on earth. Its almost like the city itself can be characterized by the same qualities of D&G’s own definition of art, as a constant “being of sensation and nothing else” (164). If you can imagine growing up in a city which itself can be defined as a “compound of percepts and affects” it makes sense to view art in a similar manner to that of D&G. Needless to say, my suggestion of Paris as more or less a personification of art helps make sense of the qualities D&G assign to art (at least id like to think so).
When thinking of the “artist’s greatest difficulty” in making art something that can “stand up on its own” this task can seem daunting. Yet possessing the ability to make art “stand up on its own” is integral to art as the artist can only accomplishes this task by ultimately composing art that goes beyond the “lived”. As D&G write, “In each case style is needed—the writer’s syntax, the musician’s modes and rhythms, the painter’s lines and colors—to raise lived perceptions to the precept and lived affections to the affect” (170). For me, D&G’s chapter on art provides an highly relevant interpretation that bounds art to its creative purposes while validating art all the while as a “bloc of sensations” that supersedes the “lived”.
Now, obviously they spend more time in the text tackling the differences between philosophy and science, so what I mean to say is how the definition and explication of art that they impart the reader is one that is highly refined. Perhaps it’s the nature of the apparent bias (and I don’t use this word in a pejorative sense) the French have towards art that inspired the rich content of D&G’s own understanding of art. Consequently, I’m more inclined to think of D&G as authorities on art more so than philosophy (all doctorates and publications aside). I mean, lets face it, Memphis is not Paris; and neither is New York City (sorry Kip and Ben), so it makes sense how D&G conception of art is almost inextricable from their own upbringing.
If you think about it, Paris is one of the few cities in the world that is simply exudes art. It leaves one feeling the rawness of human passion and emotion, incomparable to that of any other place on earth. Its almost like the city itself can be characterized by the same qualities of D&G’s own definition of art, as a constant “being of sensation and nothing else” (164). If you can imagine growing up in a city which itself can be defined as a “compound of percepts and affects” it makes sense to view art in a similar manner to that of D&G. Needless to say, my suggestion of Paris as more or less a personification of art helps make sense of the qualities D&G assign to art (at least id like to think so).
When thinking of the “artist’s greatest difficulty” in making art something that can “stand up on its own” this task can seem daunting. Yet possessing the ability to make art “stand up on its own” is integral to art as the artist can only accomplishes this task by ultimately composing art that goes beyond the “lived”. As D&G write, “In each case style is needed—the writer’s syntax, the musician’s modes and rhythms, the painter’s lines and colors—to raise lived perceptions to the precept and lived affections to the affect” (170). For me, D&G’s chapter on art provides an highly relevant interpretation that bounds art to its creative purposes while validating art all the while as a “bloc of sensations” that supersedes the “lived”.
Methods of Autonomy in Art
Percepts and Affects are born out of perceptions and affections, but unlike the philosophical concept, they preserve themselves apart from their origins. They solidify apart from their beginnings in the raw materials of the art work—color, line, shadow, light. From these they stand up, autonomous, preserve themselves such that they remain even while materials fade away. What more can we say about this process of becoming? Setting aside its nature (i.e. an expression of otherness, a realization of the non-human vague via collapse of the boundary between human subject and other), can we elaborate on the means by which such a nature is attained?
D and G relate three monumental types, three distinct patterns in which sensations stand up as monuments, as autonomous blocs. In each, a single sensation or two display movement of harmony such that they are preserved as percept and affect. The first is vibration, a single sensation that rises and falls, displays differences of level. This sensation is in no way cerebral, but it is rather nervous. The second is the embrace or the clinch, two distinct sensations that resonate so closely as to embrace tightly in a clinch, to seem to become bound by one another, though perhaps still remaining distinct. The Third is withdrawal, division or distention, two sensations that at first seems to be proximal but then draw apart.
What can we make of these descriptions? The latter two suggest that the specific interplay between sensations is what can render the work a genuine piece of art. This seems intuitively true. Often what works particularly well in a piece is contrasting emotions it evokes, such as the juxtaposition of contrasting sentiments in a novel. A satire, e.g., Voltaire’s Candide, can produce in one a pure delight in the piece’s caustic wit, yet this sensation will rely on, be closely intertwined with the painted perception of an impure, sordid philosophy, mocked throughout the interactions of a motley mix of juxtaposed characters (e.g., the naïve/the deceiving, the innocent/the underhanded manipulator, etc.). Here, distinct sensations seem to come together, revealing themselves as much more closely bound than one might originally suspect. The reverse can be equally effective. One of Damien Hirst’s sharks in formaldehyde seems to produce fission rather than fusion. The perceived strength of the deadly predator seems to split into two, as the predator and viewer at once become the prey, i.e., objects of death, as strength falls the inevitable victim of weakness, not merely one of contingent life but of the comprehension of one’s invariable end. The strength and the deadly starkly divides.
What of the first type though? A single sensation that functions not by means of interaction but by solitary movement of level. I’d like to here more said on this if it spoke to anyone.
The Event
I’m still having a little trouble wrapping my head around “the event”, which is funny considering my précis was supposed to explain it. I find I can only describe it using the same words as Deleuze and Guattari; according to them the event “is not part of the eternal, but neither is it part of time—it belongs to becoming.” (158) So basically the event is non- temporal, which is contrary to how we might usually think of an event, however it is part of the birth or becoming of…what? It would seem the event itself, as it is the event that exists between instances, not time. Since the event is no longer temporal, it is a meanwhile, which is to say it has a certain permanence. But all these meanwhiles are put on top of each other and are in zone of indescernibility where they can’t be separated. This is all fine and good I suppose, however later D&G write, “Nothing happens there, but everything becomes, so that the event has the privilege of beginning again when time is past. Nothing happens, and yet everything changes, because becoming continues to pass through its components again and to restore the event that is actualized elsewhere, at a different moment.” (158) Now what in the world are they trying to say here? I have an inkling to what it is; possibly trying to explain how the event can become and yet never change, however this just seems flawed. The idea that nothing happens and everything changes seems like an “A = -A” argument. Later they go on to say the concept that apprehends the event. I suppose it is the concept that links the event to others like it, but D&G don’t say that. They seem to assert that every event of a type are the same event. I understand that we have to try to comprehend D&G within their own system but there gets a point at which it seems I have no choice but to agree with them otherwise their system doesn’t work for me. I don’t believe that their explanation of the event is a very good argument, and it seems a little bit too abstract. In my mind, they’re trying to force temporal things into a non-temporal system. If they had said that each event was individual and temporal and the concept linked together the events of the same type into a “relationship” that was non-temporal, thus making them have a sort of immortality, then I might agree with them, especially cause I bet they would be better at describing it than me. But they don't.
On Chapter 7
Artistic works have a unique ability to become completely independent of the bodies and materials which compose them – and in doing so elevate the power of the work at hand to the level of pure sensation. This transcendent bloc of sensations is completely independent of its creator, instead having been formed through self-preservation of the sensations which arose from the original piece of art. Deleuze and Guattari posit an interesting series of steps for this artistic process, which we shall briefly examine here. First, there must be an artist in whose mind the model of the art to be created is held. The artist must also choose the materials with which the work must be created – not simply the physical materials (clay, paper, etc), but also the perceptions and affections which the artist wishes to relay or manipulate. This pool of materials somehow coalesces into a piece of work which has its own essence, conveyed through the perceptions and affections which are a part of the work. These feelings which are evoked by the work are somehow imbued with a quality which allows them to transcend the physical, material level of the world. Thus, the essential characteristic of the work becomes its transcendent quality, and the perception and affection which first regaled the audience has risen to become an independent, preserved quality. Perceptions become percepts; affections become affects. These are the timeless qualities of art which help it achieve its autonomous state, instead of a dependent state of affectation for the audience of the work.
The result which attains is that the percept and affect are able to preserve the essential qualities of the art through transcendence of the material bodies which compose it (e.g. the ink on the pages of a book, the canvas of a painting). This is because the artwork focuses and posits the key qualities of the piece as being within the artwork itself, thus wresting the power of creation from creator and bestowing it eternally to that which has been created. Thus, Art consists in freezing time, capturing a moment of sensation which is able to transcend the physical features of the artwork itself. This is an interesting juxtaposition with philosophy, which attempts to constantly relate and compare concepts whilst constantly changing the boundaries and internal connections of the concept so as to make it compatible with itself and those concepts around it.
Saturday, February 26, 2011
A Similarity Between Philosophy and Science
Deleuze and Guattari highlight the main differences between philosophy and science in Functives and Concepts; the confrontation between philosophy and science “develops under three principle heads of opposition that group the series of functives on one hand and the properties of concepts on the other” (132). One of the major differences between philosophy and science involves their respective modes of enunciation. D and G explain that science brings to light “partial observers” in relation to functions within systems of reference (as opposed to the conceptual personae in relation to fragmentary concepts on the plan of immanence) (128). Partial observers, who are neither inadequate nor subjective, are “points in view of themselves that presuppose a calibration of horizons…on the basis of slowing-downs and acceleration,” whereas conceptual personae function on the basis of infinite speed (132). Another difference that D and G discuss involves the plane of “immanence” or consistency in philosophy and the plane of “reference” in science. By retaining infinite speeds, philosophy’s plane of immanence attempts to “give the virtual a consistency specific to [the virtual]” (118). Science, on the other hand, relinquishes the infinite in order to “gain a reference able to actualize the virtual” (118). The last significant difference between philosophy and science stems from the relationship between the concept and the function; the “unconditioned” concept involves the inseparability of variations while the function involves the independence of variations in relationships that can be conditioned (126). Unlike inseparable variations, which D and G describe as “events” on a plane of immanence, independent variables are “states of affairs” in a system of reference (127).
This third difference, specifically, generates an interesting connection between philosophy and science. D and G explain that “concepts and functions appear as two types of multiplicities or varieties whose natures are different” (127). They contrast the multiplicity of science, which is defined by space, number, and time, to the multiplicity of philosophy, which is expressed by the inseparability of variations. Although the nature of these multiplicities differ, D and G explain that they create a correspondence between philosophy and science; like the coordinates of extensive abscissas in functions, there are multiple internal components within the concept. Not only do their respective multiplicities allow individuals to judge their possible collaboration, D and G also believe that they allow individuals the opportunity to determine “the inspiration of one by the other” (127). When compared to other similarities between philosophy and science (their specific relation to creation and experimentation, the “I do not know” feeling that is included in each, etc.), it seems as though this particular similarity is the least concrete. Understanding this parallel between philosophy and science involves having a proper conception of both the functive and the plane of reference. However, by drawing these types of connections between philosophy and science, we will no doubt be able to better understand each of them individually. Their similarities (in addition to their differences) will provide us with a foundation as we further explore philosophy.
This third difference, specifically, generates an interesting connection between philosophy and science. D and G explain that “concepts and functions appear as two types of multiplicities or varieties whose natures are different” (127). They contrast the multiplicity of science, which is defined by space, number, and time, to the multiplicity of philosophy, which is expressed by the inseparability of variations. Although the nature of these multiplicities differ, D and G explain that they create a correspondence between philosophy and science; like the coordinates of extensive abscissas in functions, there are multiple internal components within the concept. Not only do their respective multiplicities allow individuals to judge their possible collaboration, D and G also believe that they allow individuals the opportunity to determine “the inspiration of one by the other” (127). When compared to other similarities between philosophy and science (their specific relation to creation and experimentation, the “I do not know” feeling that is included in each, etc.), it seems as though this particular similarity is the least concrete. Understanding this parallel between philosophy and science involves having a proper conception of both the functive and the plane of reference. However, by drawing these types of connections between philosophy and science, we will no doubt be able to better understand each of them individually. Their similarities (in addition to their differences) will provide us with a foundation as we further explore philosophy.
Consistency?
A distinction between philosophy and science is found through their approach to chaos. There are three parts that need to be more thoroughly looked at to fully understand this major difference. First, we must identify a clear definition of chaos. Second, we must look at philosophy’s approach to chaos, and finally move to a description of the scientific approach to disorder. The plane of immanence and the plane of reference help to clarify these approaches to chaos, but this post is going to focus specifically on chaos and the plane of immanence. To create a more clear depiction of their differences, consistency must be considered, and I am having trouble conceiving what this means in relationship to philosophical thought. It is critical to fully understand this first distinction of science and philosophy, because it is foundational for the dissimilarities that follow, and allow for D and G to build a more solid argument.
The recognition of chaos and the management of disarray are critical to understanding why this first difference is foundational to move forward. Immanuel Kant communicates and reiterates D and G’s perspective by stating “God has put a secret into the Forces of Nature so as to enable it to fashion itself out of chaos into a perfect world system.” The primary concern with this statement to D and G are the “forces” that are involved within the reconstruction of chaotic mess. D and G define chaos as “not so much by its disorder [but] by the infinite speed with which every form taking shape in it vanishes” (118). So to further this description, chaos is the state of forms appearing and disappearing at immeasurable speeds. It is through the thought that helps to organize these chaotic states, and in this depiction it is in particular to philosophy and science, two of the three modes of thinking for D and G.
Philosophy utilizes the plane of immanence to create forms or consistency. We have discussed the plane of immanence before in class, but to clarify the plane of immanence “cuts through the chaos, selects infinites movements of thought and is filled with concepts formed like consistent particles going as fast as thought”(118). Philosophy strives to create consistency, “by giving the virtual a consistency specific to it” (118). This is where I was still a little confused in class. What does he mean by consistency? I think this is critical to understanding the plane, yet I am having trouble conceptualizing it and comparing it to the Science.
The recognition of chaos and the management of disarray are critical to understanding why this first difference is foundational to move forward. Immanuel Kant communicates and reiterates D and G’s perspective by stating “God has put a secret into the Forces of Nature so as to enable it to fashion itself out of chaos into a perfect world system.” The primary concern with this statement to D and G are the “forces” that are involved within the reconstruction of chaotic mess. D and G define chaos as “not so much by its disorder [but] by the infinite speed with which every form taking shape in it vanishes” (118). So to further this description, chaos is the state of forms appearing and disappearing at immeasurable speeds. It is through the thought that helps to organize these chaotic states, and in this depiction it is in particular to philosophy and science, two of the three modes of thinking for D and G.
Philosophy utilizes the plane of immanence to create forms or consistency. We have discussed the plane of immanence before in class, but to clarify the plane of immanence “cuts through the chaos, selects infinites movements of thought and is filled with concepts formed like consistent particles going as fast as thought”(118). Philosophy strives to create consistency, “by giving the virtual a consistency specific to it” (118). This is where I was still a little confused in class. What does he mean by consistency? I think this is critical to understanding the plane, yet I am having trouble conceptualizing it and comparing it to the Science.
Verificationism. Also Pragmatism Jumps The Distinction Between Science and Philosophy
Before I get into the meat of my blog there was something I wondered. When hearing about the difference between science and philosophy in class I couldn’t help but draw a connection to Henri Bergson. D&G’s claim that science slows down the infinite in order to gain reference of the virtual is similar to Henri Bergson’s claim. Henri Bergson claimed that science is a system of snapshots throughout an infinite plane. There is a difference between both of these theories though, Bergson argues that these snapshots does not actually completely convey reality because by taking these snapshots they lose the movement that would connect all of the individual snapshots. I was wondering if there was an influence by Bergson on D&G.
That being said I think philosophy loses quite a bit when it completely separates itself from science or from the practical world. Without using the practical world to verify itself, I believe that philosophy becomes victim to the theory of verificationsim. It is an idea that a theory only has meaning if there is some way that one can test it to be true. With things like pragmatism, philosophy can be tested by viewing how it works in the real world; pragmatism would allow itself to be tested by the real world and would not be subject to this problem, other philosophies cannot. This is my problem with D&G they completely separate philosophy from the real world so it cannot be tested, and according to verificationism it would therefore not have any meaning. Without the ability to test itself to see if it is true I can believe anything and be just as justified in it. I can believe there is a giant space turtle out in the universe that eats black holes and craps planets. Without having to subject myself to testing it I would be justified in holding those beliefs. From what I can understand you cannot verify anything that is in that infinite that D&G talk about, because as soon as you stop to test it and relate it with the real world it becomes science, unless you disproved it logically.
You cannot simply create a clear separation between the two when we can see examples of people verifying epistemic beliefs based on their experience of the world. Pragmatism argues that meaning can be found in the practical consequences of accepting that it is true. It is a question of whether our beliefs are consistent with our experiences and other beliefs that we have. For example with pragmatism I can believe that a statement like A=~A is true, as long as I can function in the everyday world and form other beliefs. That is a logical belief completely under the realm of philosophy. Anyone that beliefs quantum mechanics may have to accept that as the case. An example of this being the case would be some sects of Buddhism who can believe stuff like they both exist and don’t exist, or at the essence of everything is nothingness. If this belief turned out not to work in the real world, than we would have to create a new philosophical idea. A pragmatist looks to the real world to see if there philosophical beliefs have basis in the real world.
Pragmatist ethics would rely completely on how it worked in the world. As soon as it stops and looks to see how it works, it becomes science. So to say that philosophy exists on the infinite, and science does not, throws pragmatism out the window every time it tries to relate itself to the world and the experiences that we have.
Pragmatism uses experience of the world as a foundation for beliefs drawing connection for which we can form a belief. I don’t think anyone would argue whether the question of vigilantism is just falls under philosophy, but analyzing how it works practically in the world would be science to D&G. Either pragmatism constantly jumps between philosophy and science every time it verifies itself with experiences of the world or the dividing line drawn by D&G is not there. I may be misunderstanding D&G, but I think that this is a possible objection to the idea that there is a clear separation between science and Philosophy. I might be wrong and only large scale philosophical ideas are philosophy but when applied to the real world it becomes science. Like the idea that we should believe something if it works practically is philosophy, but actually seeing if it works practically is science. But once again that would mean that science changes philosophy. Just the general idea that experiences form all of your beliefs means that a scientific look at the world affects everything in that infinite D&G describe. The theory that experience will define your ethics, your epistemology etc, gray’s that line. Even brand new concepts don’t come out of nowhere, they come from experience.
That being said I think philosophy loses quite a bit when it completely separates itself from science or from the practical world. Without using the practical world to verify itself, I believe that philosophy becomes victim to the theory of verificationsim. It is an idea that a theory only has meaning if there is some way that one can test it to be true. With things like pragmatism, philosophy can be tested by viewing how it works in the real world; pragmatism would allow itself to be tested by the real world and would not be subject to this problem, other philosophies cannot. This is my problem with D&G they completely separate philosophy from the real world so it cannot be tested, and according to verificationism it would therefore not have any meaning. Without the ability to test itself to see if it is true I can believe anything and be just as justified in it. I can believe there is a giant space turtle out in the universe that eats black holes and craps planets. Without having to subject myself to testing it I would be justified in holding those beliefs. From what I can understand you cannot verify anything that is in that infinite that D&G talk about, because as soon as you stop to test it and relate it with the real world it becomes science, unless you disproved it logically.
You cannot simply create a clear separation between the two when we can see examples of people verifying epistemic beliefs based on their experience of the world. Pragmatism argues that meaning can be found in the practical consequences of accepting that it is true. It is a question of whether our beliefs are consistent with our experiences and other beliefs that we have. For example with pragmatism I can believe that a statement like A=~A is true, as long as I can function in the everyday world and form other beliefs. That is a logical belief completely under the realm of philosophy. Anyone that beliefs quantum mechanics may have to accept that as the case. An example of this being the case would be some sects of Buddhism who can believe stuff like they both exist and don’t exist, or at the essence of everything is nothingness. If this belief turned out not to work in the real world, than we would have to create a new philosophical idea. A pragmatist looks to the real world to see if there philosophical beliefs have basis in the real world.
Pragmatist ethics would rely completely on how it worked in the world. As soon as it stops and looks to see how it works, it becomes science. So to say that philosophy exists on the infinite, and science does not, throws pragmatism out the window every time it tries to relate itself to the world and the experiences that we have.
Pragmatism uses experience of the world as a foundation for beliefs drawing connection for which we can form a belief. I don’t think anyone would argue whether the question of vigilantism is just falls under philosophy, but analyzing how it works practically in the world would be science to D&G. Either pragmatism constantly jumps between philosophy and science every time it verifies itself with experiences of the world or the dividing line drawn by D&G is not there. I may be misunderstanding D&G, but I think that this is a possible objection to the idea that there is a clear separation between science and Philosophy. I might be wrong and only large scale philosophical ideas are philosophy but when applied to the real world it becomes science. Like the idea that we should believe something if it works practically is philosophy, but actually seeing if it works practically is science. But once again that would mean that science changes philosophy. Just the general idea that experiences form all of your beliefs means that a scientific look at the world affects everything in that infinite D&G describe. The theory that experience will define your ethics, your epistemology etc, gray’s that line. Even brand new concepts don’t come out of nowhere, they come from experience.
Friday, February 25, 2011
Conceptual Personae vs. Partial Observers
I wanted to try to further articulate the point I was trying to make in class the other day about the relationship between the partial observer and the conceptual persona. This is what I am taking away from the text, so please tell me if I am misunderstanding.
We have, I think, established that the conceptual persona, while a "life," is also a tool which the philosopher uses to create concepts which solve problems. The partial observer is a "force" which is also a sort of tool. While the identities of the conceptual persona and the partial observer are not completely separate from the philosopher or scientist, they can each be "let loose," as it were, in order to solve problems in the appropriate way.
A useful way to phrase things might be to say that the conceptual persona's job is to think, while the partial observer's job is to experience or perceive. This distinction is, as we noted, not absolute. And each entity, or whatever we call it, is also a part of the system it is analyzing. These entities function in different ways because philosophy and science solve problems differently. Philosophy is syntagmatic, science is paradigmatic.
I think that what was being objected to was the "passivity" of the partial observer. But the partial observer isn't passive so much as receptive. The partial observer observes and takes in everything around it on the plane of reference, funneling this data into the system in the form of functives. It is actively taking in information.
This is what seems to be the "point" of the partial observer. Just as the conceptual persona allows the philosopher to assume a role in order to think in ways that she otherwise would be unable to, the partial observer allows the scientist to operate on the plane of reference, divesting him of normative claims or conceptual ways of thinking and allowing him to view the plane as a set of coordinates, out of which the functives come.
Professor Johnson seemed to resist this description; I'm wondering what a more accurate account would look like. I don't think we're saying that the conceptual persona is somehow more "active" or "living" than the partial observer, unless we simply want to say that concepts are more important than functives, which I don't think D and G want to do. The partial observer is still very much a subject of experience, but that experience is interpretation rather than construction (maybe?).
We have, I think, established that the conceptual persona, while a "life," is also a tool which the philosopher uses to create concepts which solve problems. The partial observer is a "force" which is also a sort of tool. While the identities of the conceptual persona and the partial observer are not completely separate from the philosopher or scientist, they can each be "let loose," as it were, in order to solve problems in the appropriate way.
A useful way to phrase things might be to say that the conceptual persona's job is to think, while the partial observer's job is to experience or perceive. This distinction is, as we noted, not absolute. And each entity, or whatever we call it, is also a part of the system it is analyzing. These entities function in different ways because philosophy and science solve problems differently. Philosophy is syntagmatic, science is paradigmatic.
I think that what was being objected to was the "passivity" of the partial observer. But the partial observer isn't passive so much as receptive. The partial observer observes and takes in everything around it on the plane of reference, funneling this data into the system in the form of functives. It is actively taking in information.
This is what seems to be the "point" of the partial observer. Just as the conceptual persona allows the philosopher to assume a role in order to think in ways that she otherwise would be unable to, the partial observer allows the scientist to operate on the plane of reference, divesting him of normative claims or conceptual ways of thinking and allowing him to view the plane as a set of coordinates, out of which the functives come.
Professor Johnson seemed to resist this description; I'm wondering what a more accurate account would look like. I don't think we're saying that the conceptual persona is somehow more "active" or "living" than the partial observer, unless we simply want to say that concepts are more important than functives, which I don't think D and G want to do. The partial observer is still very much a subject of experience, but that experience is interpretation rather than construction (maybe?).
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