Saturday, February 26, 2011

A Similarity Between Philosophy and Science

Deleuze and Guattari highlight the main differences between philosophy and science in Functives and Concepts; the confrontation between philosophy and science “develops under three principle heads of opposition that group the series of functives on one hand and the properties of concepts on the other” (132). One of the major differences between philosophy and science involves their respective modes of enunciation. D and G explain that science brings to light “partial observers” in relation to functions within systems of reference (as opposed to the conceptual personae in relation to fragmentary concepts on the plan of immanence) (128). Partial observers, who are neither inadequate nor subjective, are “points in view of themselves that presuppose a calibration of horizons…on the basis of slowing-downs and acceleration,” whereas conceptual personae function on the basis of infinite speed (132). Another difference that D and G discuss involves the plane of “immanence” or consistency in philosophy and the plane of “reference” in science. By retaining infinite speeds, philosophy’s plane of immanence attempts to “give the virtual a consistency specific to [the virtual]” (118). Science, on the other hand, relinquishes the infinite in order to “gain a reference able to actualize the virtual” (118). The last significant difference between philosophy and science stems from the relationship between the concept and the function; the “unconditioned” concept involves the inseparability of variations while the function involves the independence of variations in relationships that can be conditioned (126). Unlike inseparable variations, which D and G describe as “events” on a plane of immanence, independent variables are “states of affairs” in a system of reference (127).

This third difference, specifically, generates an interesting connection between philosophy and science. D and G explain that “concepts and functions appear as two types of multiplicities or varieties whose natures are different” (127). They contrast the multiplicity of science, which is defined by space, number, and time, to the multiplicity of philosophy, which is expressed by the inseparability of variations. Although the nature of these multiplicities differ, D and G explain that they create a correspondence between philosophy and science; like the coordinates of extensive abscissas in functions, there are multiple internal components within the concept. Not only do their respective multiplicities allow individuals to judge their possible collaboration, D and G also believe that they allow individuals the opportunity to determine “the inspiration of one by the other” (127). When compared to other similarities between philosophy and science (their specific relation to creation and experimentation, the “I do not know” feeling that is included in each, etc.), it seems as though this particular similarity is the least concrete. Understanding this parallel between philosophy and science involves having a proper conception of both the functive and the plane of reference. However, by drawing these types of connections between philosophy and science, we will no doubt be able to better understand each of them individually. Their similarities (in addition to their differences) will provide us with a foundation as we further explore philosophy.

Consistency?

A distinction between philosophy and science is found through their approach to chaos. There are three parts that need to be more thoroughly looked at to fully understand this major difference. First, we must identify a clear definition of chaos. Second, we must look at philosophy’s approach to chaos, and finally move to a description of the scientific approach to disorder. The plane of immanence and the plane of reference help to clarify these approaches to chaos, but this post is going to focus specifically on chaos and the plane of immanence. To create a more clear depiction of their differences, consistency must be considered, and I am having trouble conceiving what this means in relationship to philosophical thought. It is critical to fully understand this first distinction of science and philosophy, because it is foundational for the dissimilarities that follow, and allow for D and G to build a more solid argument.

The recognition of chaos and the management of disarray are critical to understanding why this first difference is foundational to move forward. Immanuel Kant communicates and reiterates D and G’s perspective by stating “God has put a secret into the Forces of Nature so as to enable it to fashion itself out of chaos into a perfect world system.” The primary concern with this statement to D and G are the “forces” that are involved within the reconstruction of chaotic mess. D and G define chaos as “not so much by its disorder [but] by the infinite speed with which every form taking shape in it vanishes” (118). So to further this description, chaos is the state of forms appearing and disappearing at immeasurable speeds. It is through the thought that helps to organize these chaotic states, and in this depiction it is in particular to philosophy and science, two of the three modes of thinking for D and G.

Philosophy utilizes the plane of immanence to create forms or consistency. We have discussed the plane of immanence before in class, but to clarify the plane of immanence “cuts through the chaos, selects infinites movements of thought and is filled with concepts formed like consistent particles going as fast as thought”(118). Philosophy strives to create consistency, “by giving the virtual a consistency specific to it” (118). This is where I was still a little confused in class. What does he mean by consistency? I think this is critical to understanding the plane, yet I am having trouble conceptualizing it and comparing it to the Science.

Verificationism. Also Pragmatism Jumps The Distinction Between Science and Philosophy

Before I get into the meat of my blog there was something I wondered. When hearing about the difference between science and philosophy in class I couldn’t help but draw a connection to Henri Bergson. D&G’s claim that science slows down the infinite in order to gain reference of the virtual is similar to Henri Bergson’s claim. Henri Bergson claimed that science is a system of snapshots throughout an infinite plane. There is a difference between both of these theories though, Bergson argues that these snapshots does not actually completely convey reality because by taking these snapshots they lose the movement that would connect all of the individual snapshots. I was wondering if there was an influence by Bergson on D&G.

That being said I think philosophy loses quite a bit when it completely separates itself from science or from the practical world. Without using the practical world to verify itself, I believe that philosophy becomes victim to the theory of verificationsim. It is an idea that a theory only has meaning if there is some way that one can test it to be true. With things like pragmatism, philosophy can be tested by viewing how it works in the real world; pragmatism would allow itself to be tested by the real world and would not be subject to this problem, other philosophies cannot. This is my problem with D&G they completely separate philosophy from the real world so it cannot be tested, and according to verificationism it would therefore not have any meaning. Without the ability to test itself to see if it is true I can believe anything and be just as justified in it. I can believe there is a giant space turtle out in the universe that eats black holes and craps planets. Without having to subject myself to testing it I would be justified in holding those beliefs. From what I can understand you cannot verify anything that is in that infinite that D&G talk about, because as soon as you stop to test it and relate it with the real world it becomes science, unless you disproved it logically.
You cannot simply create a clear separation between the two when we can see examples of people verifying epistemic beliefs based on their experience of the world. Pragmatism argues that meaning can be found in the practical consequences of accepting that it is true. It is a question of whether our beliefs are consistent with our experiences and other beliefs that we have. For example with pragmatism I can believe that a statement like A=~A is true, as long as I can function in the everyday world and form other beliefs. That is a logical belief completely under the realm of philosophy. Anyone that beliefs quantum mechanics may have to accept that as the case. An example of this being the case would be some sects of Buddhism who can believe stuff like they both exist and don’t exist, or at the essence of everything is nothingness. If this belief turned out not to work in the real world, than we would have to create a new philosophical idea. A pragmatist looks to the real world to see if there philosophical beliefs have basis in the real world.

Pragmatist ethics would rely completely on how it worked in the world. As soon as it stops and looks to see how it works, it becomes science. So to say that philosophy exists on the infinite, and science does not, throws pragmatism out the window every time it tries to relate itself to the world and the experiences that we have.

Pragmatism uses experience of the world as a foundation for beliefs drawing connection for which we can form a belief. I don’t think anyone would argue whether the question of vigilantism is just falls under philosophy, but analyzing how it works practically in the world would be science to D&G. Either pragmatism constantly jumps between philosophy and science every time it verifies itself with experiences of the world or the dividing line drawn by D&G is not there. I may be misunderstanding D&G, but I think that this is a possible objection to the idea that there is a clear separation between science and Philosophy. I might be wrong and only large scale philosophical ideas are philosophy but when applied to the real world it becomes science. Like the idea that we should believe something if it works practically is philosophy, but actually seeing if it works practically is science. But once again that would mean that science changes philosophy. Just the general idea that experiences form all of your beliefs means that a scientific look at the world affects everything in that infinite D&G describe. The theory that experience will define your ethics, your epistemology etc, gray’s that line. Even brand new concepts don’t come out of nowhere, they come from experience.

Friday, February 25, 2011

Conceptual Personae vs. Partial Observers

I wanted to try to further articulate the point I was trying to make in class the other day about the relationship between the partial observer and the conceptual persona.  This is what I am taking away from the text, so please tell me if I am misunderstanding.

We have, I think, established that the conceptual persona, while a "life," is also a tool which the philosopher uses to create concepts which solve problems.  The partial observer is a "force" which is also a sort of tool.  While the identities of the conceptual persona and the partial observer are not completely separate from the philosopher or scientist, they can each be "let loose," as it were, in order to solve problems in the appropriate way.

A useful way to phrase things might be to say that the conceptual persona's job is to think, while the partial observer's job is to experience  or perceive.  This distinction is, as we noted, not absolute.  And each entity, or whatever we call it, is also a part of the system it is analyzing.  These entities function in different ways because philosophy and science solve problems differently.  Philosophy is syntagmatic, science is paradigmatic.

I think that what was being objected to was the "passivity" of the partial observer.  But the partial observer isn't passive so much as receptive.  The partial observer observes and takes in everything around it on the plane of reference, funneling this data into the system in the form of functives.  It is actively taking in information.

This is what seems to be the "point" of the partial observer.  Just as the conceptual persona allows the philosopher to assume a role in order to think in ways that she otherwise would be unable to, the partial observer allows the scientist to operate on the plane of reference, divesting him of normative claims or conceptual ways of thinking and allowing him to view the plane as a set of coordinates, out of which the functives come.

Professor Johnson seemed to resist this description; I'm wondering what a more accurate account would look like.  I don't think we're saying that the conceptual persona is somehow more "active" or "living" than the partial observer, unless we simply want to say that concepts are more important than functives, which I don't think D and G want to do.  The partial observer is still very much a subject of experience, but that experience is interpretation rather than construction (maybe?).

Saturday, February 19, 2011

Approach to Subject of Artistic Beauty

Although intimate, the aesthetic experience escapes all inquiry of its nature. We had searched, in vain, for centuries. The history of aesthetics from Plato in the 5th century B.C.E to Hume in the 17th attempts to locate the beautiful in the object. During this time, the beautiful either unveils itself directly—e.g., in the work’s quality of mimesis, greek term signifying the imitation or impression of the real, or, beauty unveils itself indirectly—e.g., in taste, which is none other than the capacity of the rational subject to recognize the objectives conditions of beauty in the work. It’s not until the 18th century that Kant recognizes that beauty possesses a subjective element, a certain pleasure evoked in the subject. This seems evident now. To experience the beautiful is to experience a particular sentiment.

Thus reasons Kant in the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment in examining the deep tension between subject and object by way of four movements or conditions of the beautiful. This allows him not only to resolve problems of objectivity/subjectivity but also though concerning, for example, the difference between natural beauty and artistic beauty, the origin of the work, etc. Nonetheless, these conditions don’t suffice to formulate a complete aesthetic theory; they neglect certain artistic mediums, specifically conceptual art. It’s also not evident how these conditions are unified as a class, an absence inviting us to suspect them as an arbitrary medley.

I propose a thesis in which I hold that these four conditions or movements of beauty described by Kant should be interpreted as a necessity of the effect of the work on the powers of introspection. This introduces the possibility to introduce further conditions of the same type which would incorporate neglected art forms (e.g. much non-visual art). This will push beauty towards the subjective. Like Kant, I’ll work to balance a theory of beauty containing subjective and objective elements: the work unveils itself as an object providing a particular impact upon specific internal mental states of the subject; nevertheless, this relation between work and mind reflects an objective fact of nature.

Genius and the Aesthetic Experience

As mentioned in class last Tuesday, I’m considering writing my final thesis on the topic of philosophical taste. (I know this is my third consecutive post on the subject taste, so please bear with me one more time as this particular subject is currently motivating my philosophical interests.) Overall, taste bears much relevance to the “aesthetic experience”. Hence I’m interest in understanding what qualifies our encounter with the “beautiful” object, via the aesthetic experience, as something that can be subjectively experienced, but universally supported. To put the question in broader terms, I guess you could say I’m interested in discovering how/why we makes claims about beauty, particular in the area of fine art (i.e. theater, music, etc..).

Luckily, Kant wrote his senior thesis on this subject as well. Kant argues that we cannot make judgments about beauty unless be do so from good taste. Hence the only way we can go about creating/understanding “beauty” in art is through our faculty of taste. In order to make judgments from good taste, however, we must first have a necessary “skill” or “talent” for doing so. This “skill” is what Kant calls genius. While genius enables the artist to acknowledge her obligation to making aesthetic judgment from good taste, it is taste itself which “disciplines” our genius.

Moreover, Genius equips the artist with an ability to create art that does not depend upon an a prior concept of beauty itself. This makes our encounter with the “beautiful” object subjectively possible. Thus genius and taste go hand-in-hand throughout the “aesthetic experience”.

Perhaps a brief analogy will present the connection between genius an taste more fully in light of our aesthetic experience. Take, for example, the artist who finds inspiration from another work of art. The artist finds beauty in that particular work of art and wishes to recreate what she finds “beautiful” from that work of art in her own work. This is an example of bad taste. If the artist applies what she finds “beautiful” from the already existing work of art to her own composition, then she lacks the genius to create purely original art. Thus her creative process for making art originated from bad taste.

The same is also true of bad taste when an artist tries to convey beauty in an overly abstract way. Perhaps this is because the artist is without the necessary skill or talent that is required for her genius to prevail. Instead, the artist compensates for her lack of genius by creating art that in no way communicates beauty as something desirable. In both cases the viewer is “turned off” by the art, either because the art lacks creativity, or because the artist has produced the art in a way that is virtually incommunicable to the listener.

This is where I’d like to commence with my study of taste. I find it fascinating how taste can support a subjective encounter with the “beautiful”, while at the same time making that encounter “universally understood”.

Who's Afriaid of Red Yellow Blue



                I have mentioned in class that one of my favorite artists is Robert Irwin, an abstract expressionist who eventually abandoned painting because he became more interested with the environment that a work of art occupies rather than the work of art himself. Much of Irwin's work is phenomenological, focusing on the act of seeing rather than the work as an object to be considered. In this way, Irwin is a deeply philosophical artist, preoccupied with human experience as it relates to the world. Irwin’s Who’s Afraid of Red, Yellow, Blue? is a great introduction to Irwin's ideas. A take on a Barnett Newman abstract painting of the same title, this installation is composed of 6 large reflective rectangular panels – two red, two yellow and two blue. The panels, placed side by side linearly in the middle of the room, drawing on a classic sense of perspective. Further, the white emptiness of the room in which the artwork is installed is necessary experience the full visual effect that the installation represents in an instant.
       The panels, all of the same size, are inescapably large. When entering the room, one first encounters the red panels, then the yellow panels and the blue ones at the far end of the room. Purposefully set side by side, each panel is highly reflective and when looking straight on from the entrance to the installation, one can begin to the see the form of the other panels inside of the front red panel in the foreground. Looking straight on at the work from the entrance, as if to see red first, then yellow and then blue descending off into space, the effects of absorption and reflection confront the viewer. Not only does one detect the other panels and lights in the highly reflective surface, but this very detection alters the physical nature of the apprehended panel itself. What one had initially detected red becomes something much more than color and form but a mirror by which to reconsider one’s connection notions of absolute color. Whatever opaque understanding of what constitutes something as red or yellow or blue is reconstructed in Irwin’s installation. The composition of the panels in conjunction with the light filtering into the space renders the viewer’s vision momentarily changed. As one walks around the installation, each panel takes on new life – the content of each transformed by virtue of its highly reflective surface as well as the light and space of the room.  The colors themselves are reflected onto one another, and something like yellow on yellow becomes much more than color.
Providing the viewer with a new set of relationships, Irwin takes the most familiar and basic elements of vision, the primary colors, and represents them in a new challenging way meant to make the viewer aware of their complacent knowledge of the world. Irwin forces the viewer to go beyond merely looking and into apprehension, beginning to see according to the work of art rather than merely looking at it.
Martin Heidegger’s, The Origin of the Work of Art asks the fundamental question: what is the source of the nature of the so-called work of art? Heidegger indentifies works of art as “naturally present as thing” insofar as the work can be “shipped like coal.” However, a thing is “not merely an aggregate of traits, nor an accumulation of properties by which that aggregate arises” yet, when apprehended, the work of art seems to posses qualities that are self-evident. Heidegger argues that in order to fully assess the “undisguised presence” of the work of art, we must disassociated our prior conceptions that have nothing to do with the specificity of the object.
Adopting this notion of specificity and greater meaning the physical composition of the object itself, Irwin aims to generate inquiry by presenting something other than a mere object. Appropriating nothing, Irwin open’s up our vision to the conditions in which an object exists; discarding the disclosed being of a thing in favor of fully present energy. In this way, Irwin’s installations participate in Heidegger’s notion that “the work belongs, as a work, uniquely within the realm opened up by itself,” controlling the present conditions of a work in order to reveal the conditions by which experience all things – through the apprehension of light and space.
 For my senior thesis, I would like make use of contemporary art examples, mainly minimalist and post-minimalist art, in order to express how the performance of a body in space instantiates philosophical inquiry and is related to philosophical theory. In other words, an interaction with the space that Irwin can affected the viewer in such a way to direct  towards concepts that the viewer may have had. I think I am going to use Martin Heidegger, Micheal Fried, Judith Butler and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 

Trying to Put My Thoughts in Words

As was evident last class, I have some trouble explaining the ideas I want to explore in my paper. I guess I want to explain how I understand the world in a certain respect so maybe I should just try that here and see what you guys think.
First of all, aside from scientific explanations, the world is absurd. The unreasonableness I identify has more to do with the “why” than the “how”. Science can explain how something happens because these things can be observed and identified; why they occur is a different matter entirely. We are drawn towards a universal perspective or “god’s-eye-view” of the world where there is a single standard of truth but I can find no evidence of this. Instead, I believe we all have our individual perspectives which we work off of. This doesn’t necessarily mean that we can do whatever we want because there is no standard, but rather that all our perspectives are equally valid, in a certain sense, and we have to respect each other’s perspectives equally. In this way we are able to make our own meanings in our lives and are not required to subscribe to anyone else’s ideas. This realization also frees us from feeling bound by what we view as universal or community standards. We have to keep in mind at the same time to respect each other’s perspectives, so while we may disagree with others, we should regard other perspectives with same respect we expect for ourselves. This leads us to come to something like the golden rule of treating others the way we would like to be treated. If we reach this point, then we might come to the realization that helping other people helps ourselves because the goodness of the community trickles down to the individual.
I have a lot of ideas I’m trying to incorporate here and I know I’m forgetting something that might make it more sensible, but I’m interested in what you guys have to say about these things. I’m still trying to flesh these ideas out in my head and any suggestions for where I should turn for explanations that will help me with my ideas would be appreciated.

Monday, February 14, 2011

More Taste...

In light of my previous post, I would like to draw attention furthermore to the philosophical notion taste. This time, however, I’d like make note of the similarities between D&G understanding of taste with that of Kant’s own notion of taste.
Personally, my exposure to the notion of taste (in its philosophical context, that is) comes mainly from professor Grady’s class on Aesthetics. When it was all said and done, we focused on the notion of taste for almost half of the semester, considering the different interpretations of taste through likes of Hegel, Kant, and Hume. The question we were most concerned with dealt with how taste determines our judgments of aesthetics value (i.e. what constitutes our calling an object beautiful/desirable). In other words, when we make judgments about beauty (especially in art and nature) are such judgments made from good taste? This also applies to how we properly go about creating beautiful objects through means of fine art (i.e. music, painting, etc…). Whether we are creating beauty or calling an object beautiful we must acknowledge taste as the principle faculty for such. Thus one of our goals in the class was to unpack the notion of taste with hopes of uncovering how it is properly used in the context of beauty and its conceptual importance to aesthetics.

For both Kant and D&G, taste is ultimately what unites our faculties (e.g. reason, imagination, and understanding). While Kant finds the notion of taste important to forming aesthetic judgments, D&G apply taste in a similar manner to the creation of concepts via the “laying out, the inventive, and creating” process that constitutes the “philosophical trinity”. In chapter 3, D&G explain that “philosophical taste” is “the love of the well-made concepts” (77). If we apply this notion of taste furthermore, we see how Kant employs a similar notion of taste in our forming of aesthetic judgments.

Kant insists that we cannot rely upon prior concepts of beauty when describing the “Beautiful” (that is, if we want to make what we call “beautiful” universally understood). Instead, we must understand beauty as that which constantly develops new conceptual features on its own “limitless plane”. Identifying these new conceptual feature demands that we do not appeal to, nor recreate prior concepts of beauty, but requires a highly creative/inventive process that pry’s into the faculty of our imagination. If we neglect to consider this when creating new conceptual features of beauty, then we are acting in bad taste.Hence, we cannot simply recreate what we call “beautiful” from a prior concept of beauty. D&G’s example of Van Gough’s “yellow” on page 78 highlights this feature of taste in an accurate manner consistent with that of Kant’s own understanding.

“Van Gough takes yellow to the limitless only by inventing the man-sunflower and by laying out the plane of infinite little commas. The taste for colors shows at once the respect with which they must be approached, the long wait that must be passed through, but also the limitless creation that makes them exist” (78).

Here, D&G’s example of Van Gough brings to mind the attentive process that one must undergo when building upon existing concepts. This process, which is only possible through means of taste, is manifest in the “well-made concept” that is creates. Thus the principle similarity between Kantian and D&G is how taste essentially allows us to create/develop new concepts.

Overall, I find the notion of taste rather fascinating in its context of philosophy; particularly how it lends to us the capability of making beautiful things. Perhaps this comparison to Kantian taste underscores the salient features of taste when applying the term to the D&G’s “philosophical trinity”.

Taste: The Philosopher's Duty to Philosophy

Thus far we see how D&G sum up philosophy in chapter 3 as the “laying out, inventing and creating” of concepts. This process of “laying out, inventing, and creating concepts”, also denoted as the “philosophical trinity”, essentially enables one to engage philosophy as a study. The laying out of concepts via plane of immanence, the “inventing” and “bringing to life” made possible through the conceptual personae, and the subsequent creating of concepts complete the this “philosophical trinity” (76). These tree elements of philosophy, which, again, constitute the “philosophy trinity”, correspond in nature to our faculties of reason, imagination, and understanding (in that order; see page 77). In some ways, one could argue how the process of “laying out, inventing, and creating” becomes the duty of all philosophers to philosophy. Thus it becomes important for the philosopher to cultivate her faculties of reason, imagination and understanding when trying to discover/create new philosophical concepts.

Yet philosophy requires more than simply possessing reason, imagination, and understanding, which alone does not properly qualify one to engage philosophy. This is where the notion of taste finds relevance to our study of philosophy. Taste, as an independent faculty, allows for the “philosophical coadaptation” of reason, imagination, and understanding. Taste is essentially the cornerstone of philosophy which unites the philosopher’s faculties of reason, imagination, and understanding. Taste creates a philosophical harmony between our faculties of reason, imagination, and understanding and allows them to work unison. It is through the faculty of taste that the philosopher’s duty to philosophy ultimately becomes manifest.
If the philosopher is a like a three-piece puzzle, comprised of reason, imagination, and understanding, then taste is how we go about putting the pieces of the puzzle together. Moreover, if taste is the “love of the well-made concept” then disciplining our faculty of taste becomes an integral part of philosophy.

An issue I take with D&G’s notion of taste examines where taste comes from. Reason, imagination, and understanding are seemingly inherent faculties of the mind, but where and how do we employ our faculty of taste. More importantly, how do we cultivate taste? If we taste is the “love of the well-made concept”, then where do we find the “well-made concept”.

In my opinion, D&G’s explanation of taste as the “philosophical coadaptation” of reason, imagination, and understanding is the most important point they’ve made thus far. Nonetheless, it demands close attention for we cannot progress on the subject of philosophy without a clear understanding of taste.

The Presumption of Atheism

Many times throughout the book D and G mention that transcendence makes immanence impossible.  This means that philosophy is impossible.  On page 92, they write, "Perhaps Christianity does not produce concepts except through its atheism, through the atheism that it, more than any other religion, secretes."  I don't know exactly what they mean when they say that Christianity secretes atheism, except perhaps that people reject it more.  They claim that atheism and the death of God are not problems for the philosopher, and that "It is amazing that so many philosophers still take the death of God as tragic."  Atheism is the triumph and the summation of philosophy, it seems.

I take issue with that (shocking!).  D and G take for granted that there can be no Christian philosophy because of Christian transcendence, and then write off the Christian philosophers by claiming that they were acting like atheists.  This is surely a questionable move.  For one thing, there clearly seems to be Christian philosophy, and in fact many great philosophers were either Christians or theists or at least believed in some sort of transcendence.  By D and G's definition, do we count out Kierkegaard, Descartes, Pascal, Aquinas, Augustine, Anselm, and even Plantinga?  Clearly these people were or are philosophers, and so the problem, I think, lies if not with D and G's definition of philosophy, at least with their presupposition that all good philosophers must be concerned with this world only.  If there is a clear instance of a referent that does not fit your definition, it is not the referent that should be explained away but your definition which must be broadened.  If Christianity has produced no concepts, then I have no idea what a concept could be.

Maybe I'm misunderstanding or oversimplifying what D and G are trying to say, and maybe, like the debate over conceptual personae as having life, I am being misled by rhetoric.  But it is obvious that D and G are waging a war against transcendence.  But I would wager that this war has atheism as a presupposition rather than a necessary outcome.  I just don’t see the causal link between transcendence and the impossibility of philosophy. 

“Religions do not arrive at the concept without denying themselves,” say D and G.  I don’t know what they could mean by this except that perhaps when religion deals with concepts it stops being religion and enters the realm of philosophy, but even then I don’t think we should draw an absolute distinction between the two.  There are at least concepts which are about religion, aren’t there?  Is “God” a concept?  Is “transcendence” a concept?  What about “grace” as Paul or Luther or Calvin have defined it?  Depending on the answers to these questions, we are left with two possibilities: 1) If D and G answer “No,” they are begging the question and excluding religious concepts a priori to fit their definition.  This is certainly not fair.  2) If D and G answer “Yes,” then they must admit that religion, if it does not create concepts, at least employs them, which they seem to want to deny.  In which case, why are they so eager to cut Christianity out of the picture and trumpet atheism as the jewel on the philosopher’s crown?  Surely “God” is the most important concept ever created (if created it was)?  Even the atheist’s denial of God, even the death of God, could not exist without this necessary precondition. 

Am I just totally missing the mark here?

Saturday, February 12, 2011

All thinking is Conceptual Persona

I was thinking more about conceptual persona. As we know Cp is when a person creates a character to ask questions that the philosopher must answer. I was thinking more about this and I was wondering if experience would itself be a form of conceptual persona. If your experience is subjective wouldn’t any experience that poses a philosophical question be a form of CP because it was created from a character formed from that experience.
In addition wouldn’t any question posed by an outside source be considered CP because of subjectivity of experience. As it is said earlier people cannot share the exact same concepts as one another, even if there is complete understanding they are different because different people are thinking them. If a person proposes a philosophical question to a person that person is interpreting that concept, they are therefore creating their own concept through the interpretation. They are creating their own CP by interpreting the information they got earlier. And by working through those concepts it would be the same as if it were figured out through CP and working through it. Therefore reading a philosophy book would be the same operation as Descartes Cogito. Through the act of interpretation and translation to propose the question to ourselves, we are constantly creating Conceptual Persona. And if this is the case, it would seem that all thinking then would require conceptual persona, not just Philosophy. In addition where does the CP end does my thinking 10 minutes ago qualify as a completely different person? Every time we are thinking we are constantly putting on different costumes in order to analyze the things we are thinking. Our experiences form our thinking and build our costumes so all of our thinking would be the result of something that happened earlier in our lives. We put on a Kant costume because of our experiences with Kant. So philosophy is really just a remembering of past experiences so it is a plane of reference in that sense. Now I bring myself back to the question I had a couple weeks ago about whether or not science is just a philosophy. In science to figure out the patterns in the real world based on the data we have experience with. In Philosophy we are doing the same exact thing, the only difference is philosophy has trouble being tested in the real world. Philosophy at our level is merely a science because it is based on our experiences with the things we have read and we try to find some truth in it, some pattern. We haven’t truly created completely new concepts we were taught them. Our philosophical data that we have been acquiring over the last 4 years has been combined to make our thoughts, and every blog post is merely trying to find truth or debunk some of the data we may have seen. Unless the ideas came completely from our own head it is the same as science because every bit of data we acquire is turned into a conceptual persona that we try to make truth from.

The "Conceptual Persona" is an inevitable product of the yet-unproven theory of immanence.

A large part of my problem with D&G's second chapter is that it seems forced by chapter three.  What I mean is this -- they were almost certainly committed to the ideas of immanence and the plane of immanence before they started writing chapter two.  Once we accept immanence, the idea of the autonomous conceptual persona virtually writes itself.  That doesn't mean that it's the correct model of reality; it's validity rests on that of immanence itself, which has, as of yet gone unproven.

When Descartes, for instance created the cogito, he almost certainly did not concieve of "the Idiot" (itself a moniker applied later) as a conceptual persona.  I believe this, because Descartes, like the vast majority of historic Philosophers believed in transcendence.  If we were to take a transcendent bearing with respect to the Idiot, we could very easily characterize Descartes as the "creator", and the Idiot as a step in his thinking process, functioning essentially as a premise in the proof for the Cogito.  To say, as D&G do, that Descartes could not reach the Cogito without the Idiot is true, but only in the sense that a proof without a necessary premise isn't a functioning proof at all.  To say that the Idiot has autonomy apart from Descartes' will that allows it to do things that Descartes cannot is absolutely absurd.  The Idiot -- all of its choices, its goals, and its ultimate end -- are products of Descartes, not of the Idiot's own autonomy.  No, Descartes can't actually doubt away all of his beliefs, but he can explore the possibility in his head.  The Idiot is just a tool in this process, something that Descartes wields as he shapes the Cogito from other concepts, concepts that, incidentally belong to Descartes' memory, not the Idiot's.

This model is so simple, so natural that I think we have to ask why D&G take the tack that they do, fighting for the autonomy of the conceptual persona.  I think it is because they cannot do otherwise while remaining committed to the idea of immanence.  To take up the simple model of thought that I have framed above, they would have to admit of a "creator" and "created" distinction, which they absolutely cannot do while advancing the idea of the plane of immanence.  Therefore, the Idiot (and all their other examples of conceptual personae, for that matter) must exist on the same plane as the end-concept's "signer" and the concept, itself.  After we understand what D&G want to say in chapter three, chapter two must read the way it does.  If D&G want me to take chapter two or three seriously, they are going to have to better explicate the reasons for me to buy into immanence.  As of now, it doesn't click with me, despite my outside reading.  The transcendence model is so much more natural to me, and What is Philosophy? has not given me the slightest reason to feel differently.

The Geophilosophical Domain(?)

In the beginning of Deleuze and Guattari’s chapter on Geophilosophy, there is a frenzy of new assertions which appeared messy and troublesome to me. It seems helpful to dissect the beginning distinctions which are laid out. D & G state “thinking is neither a line drawn between subject and object nor a revolving of one around the other” (86). Clearly they are attempting to draw the distinction which has been made a focal point in philosophy since the early modern period – that between the observation and that which is observed. In shirking off this dichotomy, D & G are attempting to go past what have become familiar mainstays in philosophy. Instead, D & G believe that “thinking takes place in the relationship of territory and the earth” (85). This territory is constantly re-molding and shaping in accord with the contours of thought which are being deterritorialized – or rearranged and changed, destroyed, etc.

This alteration of the domain of thinking can be carried out in two ways, and is either relative or absolute in scope. Relative deterritorialization has as its object “the historical relationship of the earth with the territorites that take shape and pass away on it…” (88). This form of deterritorialization seems to be concerned primarily with connections between the tangible and actual in the world. On the other hand, deterritorialization is absolute when it crosses over, or extends into the conceptual plane of immanence. D & G state that an absolute deterritorialization entails that “the earth passes into the pure plane of immanence of a Being-thought…a Nature-thought of infinite diagrammatic movements” (88). In this moment, all the elements of the earth are somehow conferred upon this plane and thus help to re-invent the earth by giving the base from which a new world is posited. The words may make sense to me, however the conceptualization of this process is still difficult.

Trying to Speak on D&G

I think Deleuze & Guattari’s idea of Conceptual Persona is the easiest of their ideas to grasp so far. While Concepts and the Plane of Immanence seem highly theoretical and intangible, Conceptual Personae are roles we take part in whenever we participate in class and appeal to ideas and theories not our own. It’s not so much that we’re wearing a “Kant costume” or whatever, but that we speak on ideas by way of Kant’s theories. Instead of pretending to be the philosopher, we describe things in a way we would not be able to without their writings. It’s at this point in talking about Conceptual Personae that I realize how simple of an idea it might be and how little I have to say about it. I can’t say much beyond their being roles we play when philosophizing other than ourselves. D & G’s ideas seem so basic and foundation that once you finally understand them you cannot say much more than “that’s how it is”. I don’t really have much to compare it to, either. It seems their philosophy precedes any human actions, ethics or logic. These are universals that are present before the individual enters the picture, and as such there is not much to argue with. If I knew some other pre-philosophical ideas I might be able to compare them to D & G’s ideas, but as it stands I can only say “yeah, that seems right”. It’s funny how much time and effort it takes to understand these cats’ ideas and then once the pieces fit together I have so little to speak on. Sometimes I feel like I’m trying to philosophize about Algebraic formulas: yes they work, yes I know how to use them, but no, I don’t have anything stimulating to say about them. I don’t hate “What is Philosophy”, in fact I like it and think it’s more truthful and universal than a lot of texts we have read in philosophy classes. However it is so basic and cut-and-dry that I cannot find any room for interpretation or question. All I know is that D& G’s ideas of Concepts, the Plane of Immanence and Conceptual Personae are what they are and are true to life and experience. These are ideas that I have never even considered before and as such I’m just going to agree with the first set of theories (D & G’s) until I am presented with something different, at which point I will figure out which one is more “truthful” or “correct”.

Similarities between D/G and Descartes??

Deleuze and Guattaris have called into question texts that have seemed foundational to our philosophical knowledge. We have taken weeks now to have a better grasp of D and G, their definitions of new terms and their oppositions to these philosophers arguments that have seemed so concrete in our learning process. Some of us are taking modern philosophy this term, and we have been studying Descartes now for a few weeks. The systematic assumptions and the methodical argument proposed by Decartes has left me swayed by his argument in many ways, but I feel that D and G propose a strong opposition at the beginning of chapter 3. It is assumed by Descartes that “everyone knows what thinking means,” and that “everyone can think… and know truth.” There are two parts to this claim. First, there is the assumption that everyone can think. Secondly, there is the assumption that people can know truth. Although D and G emphasize that these claims are unwarranted, Decartes does not make this assumption without first trying to prove his philosophical though, and I feel there are similarities between the two arguments that are not distinguished in the text.

First, there is the issue of knowing that “I think.” Descartes proves this argument by doubting anything and everything that he think he knows, that is apparent in his knowledge, and experienced in his life. When he finally can’t doubt anything else, he is able to make the claim that because he is at least thinking these thoughts he has the ability to know. In the beginning of chapter three, D and G propose the idea of the idiot. The idiot is brought about through their interpretation of the conceptual personae, and perceived as a conceptual personae. The idiot is described as “the private thinker… [that] forms a concept with innate that everyone possess on their own account of right.” The idiot within the context of the conceptual personae was depicted in class as the devils advocate or the ability to step away from what we think we know and “doubt” our knowledge. Although there is a difference drawn between them, it seems that Descartes does this exact thing throughout the cogito to prove the claim that because I am thinking, this constitutes a sort of existence.

Secondly, D and G reiterate the other claim of Descartes that because I think, I am able to know truth. I feel that it is this claim that creates the opposition between the idiot and Descartes cogito. The idiot plays the role of being “dumb” to reiterate the knowledge that is attained, and to further know the knowledge that is assumed over time. Within the cogito, Descartes does assume that through recognizing his ability to doubt and rebuild the world through assumptions there is a sense of “knowing.” Although there seems to be a difference, does the idiot not do the same thing? Does he not play dumb in order to reiterate the point or the knowledge that he has attained?

I may be misinterpreting the text, but these two oppositions two Descartes cogito seem to have similarities, just different names. Did anyone recognize or feel this same way. Also, if there seems to be a misinterpretation of the reading, I would appreciate some guidance to help me further understand.

The Success and Failure of Philosophy

Deleuze and Guattari explain that philosophy presents three elements, “each of which fits with the other two but must be considered for itself:” the prephilosophical plane [philosophy] must lay out, the concepts it must create, and the personae it must invent and bring to life (76). When faced with a philosophical problem, an individual is able to use these activities to gauge the truth value of opposing opinions (79). D and G, however, also explain that philosophy “lives in a permanent crisis” because the relationship between the prephilosophical plane, concepts, and personae, are problematic by nature (82). Each instance is found within the others, but each remains distinct; they “coexist” and “subsist” without disappearing into the other (81). Unlike science, which uses language to discuss the conditions of extensional propositions, philosophy uses language to refer to the conditions to the intensional conditions of consistency. Therefore, even though a concept possesses the ability to serve as a solution to a philosophical problem, it only has meaning in relation to the image of thought it refers to and the conceptual personae it needs. Because the criteria of each of these philosophical activities are found in the others (the “whole” of the problem consists in constructing two when the third is underway), philosophy cannot speak to the “success” or “failure” of a certain solution until the three instances have been established (81). Once these instances are developed, D and G explain that the success or failure of philosophy is determined by categories like “Interesting,” “Remarkable,” and “Important” (82).
Within this specific description, D and G seem to suggest that an individual’s reaction to the inner workings of philosophy directly entails its success or failure. Although the three elements of philosophy (the prephilosophical plane, concepts, and conceptual personae) may work together to properly and effectively determine the truth value of opinions, the “success” of these instances is based on whether or not the individual finds them notably unusual and meaningful. Must philosophy be “interesting,” “remarkable,” and “important” to the philosopher to be successful (and, therefore, to avoid “failure”), or is philosophy still able to flourish in the absence of these characteristics? The development of these philosophical elements is clearly dependent upon the mind of the individual, but it seems as though their construction alone is significant enough for them to stand, even if the individual finds them boring, ordinary, and unimportant. Can philosophy exist at any point on its own, or is it always dependent upon the mind and categories of its creators?

Saturday, February 5, 2011

Conceptual Personae as Coming to Life

Allen's concern regarding the autonomy of the conceptual personae is a legitimate one. It's not evident how we can think of the fictional character, a mere figment of the philosopher, as coming to life. Certainly, it makes sense to say of e.g., a novelist, that one can 'bring a character to life', even when such a character is purely fictional. At the very least, it is not strikingly contrary to talk about the fictitious as if it were alive. Yet to insist that such characters are alive in the sense that they may free themselves from the puppet strings pinning them to the manipulating hands of their creators, to think of them as more than mere representatives, is a substantially bolder claim. We think of the ego as belonging to Descartes, Socrates as the mouthpiece of Plato. In what sense then are the conceptual personae autonomous? When D and G suggest as much, are they advocating some kind of subversion of the philosopher himself? Is philosophy no longer his own proper domain but that of his inventions?

Regardless of their status as free agents, the conceptual personae, G and D suggest, play an important structural or intermediary role in philosophy. If philosophy demands the creation of concepts, and this creation takes play on a plane of immanence, then the conceptional personae is that which felicitates the creation of such concepts on the plane; the CP link or draw together the creation of new concepts from or out of the pre-philosophical plane. The CP are the methodological tool of the philosopher. The question then becomes how a tool can be considered autonomous from its operator.

Perhaps this tool is one of necessity. The philosopher employs the CP to do as such because he wouldn't be able to do so without them. This might transfer the relation of dependence between the philosopher and the CP. But are they necessary? We've occasionally discussed the process of creating concepts in almost super-natural terms: concepts are created in a moment of infinite survey at an infinite speed; their coming together of their constituent parts traverses the plane infinitely but instantaneously. Yet we should be careful to posit some kind of magical emergence of concepts from the philosopher. To the contrary, D and G suggest he requires methodological tools, without which he would be unable to complete his task.

One such example is Descartes. How could Descartes himself doubt away the external world, ridding himself of all his personhood except for his ego? That is, how could he himself truly employ the violent doubt for which he advocates in the Meditations? He would be defying his own biology do so, not to mention that success in such an attempt would result in an ego that would no longer be properly understood as Descartes (i.e. it would not possess 99% of his believes, desires, intentions, etc). Yet this ego, which contains genuine subjectivity almost by definition performs most of the work of the Meditations. Descartes requires the ego to instantiate the properties it does in order to advance his argument. Descartes liberates the ego in the sense that he himself cannot instantiate it, so he detaches himself from it, allowing is to take on the subjective nature Descartes wants to exploit. Yet Descartes does not himself determine the nature of this ego; he simply postulates its existence, allows it to develop and observes the properties it takes on. This rotates the relation of dependence 180 degrees of what we might expect. The ego does not rely on Descartes, for it possesses its own subjectivity, its own properties. But rather, Descartes relies on the properties of this subjectivity (i.e. not being able to doubt its own doubt) in order to advance his meditations and flesh out other concepts that he puts forth. Descartes doesn't determine these properties of the ego, he merely relates them to us. In a sense, it makes more sense to speak of the subjectivity of the ego as genuinely possessing these properties for itself, which suggests a legitimate claim to autonomy from Descartes.

It would be foolish to infer from this example that somehow the philosopher serves a subsidiary role in philosophy. I think this merely suggests that he (at least in this case) does not create concepts by some deus ex machina process, but rather, he possesses legitimate tools, which themselves contain subjective properties, undetermined by the philosopher, that are required for the formation of concepts. We might say then that conceptual personae are alive and autonomous in the sense that they possess subjective qualities undetermined by the philosopher, and thus, they don't rely on the philosopher for themselves. It is rather the contrary: philosophers rely on them for the creation of concepts.

Wednesday, February 2, 2011