Deleuze and Guattari highlight the main differences between philosophy and science in Functives and Concepts; the confrontation between philosophy and science “develops under three principle heads of opposition that group the series of functives on one hand and the properties of concepts on the other” (132). One of the major differences between philosophy and science involves their respective modes of enunciation. D and G explain that science brings to light “partial observers” in relation to functions within systems of reference (as opposed to the conceptual personae in relation to fragmentary concepts on the plan of immanence) (128). Partial observers, who are neither inadequate nor subjective, are “points in view of themselves that presuppose a calibration of horizons…on the basis of slowing-downs and acceleration,” whereas conceptual personae function on the basis of infinite speed (132). Another difference that D and G discuss involves the plane of “immanence” or consistency in philosophy and the plane of “reference” in science. By retaining infinite speeds, philosophy’s plane of immanence attempts to “give the virtual a consistency specific to [the virtual]” (118). Science, on the other hand, relinquishes the infinite in order to “gain a reference able to actualize the virtual” (118). The last significant difference between philosophy and science stems from the relationship between the concept and the function; the “unconditioned” concept involves the inseparability of variations while the function involves the independence of variations in relationships that can be conditioned (126). Unlike inseparable variations, which D and G describe as “events” on a plane of immanence, independent variables are “states of affairs” in a system of reference (127).
This third difference, specifically, generates an interesting connection between philosophy and science. D and G explain that “concepts and functions appear as two types of multiplicities or varieties whose natures are different” (127). They contrast the multiplicity of science, which is defined by space, number, and time, to the multiplicity of philosophy, which is expressed by the inseparability of variations. Although the nature of these multiplicities differ, D and G explain that they create a correspondence between philosophy and science; like the coordinates of extensive abscissas in functions, there are multiple internal components within the concept. Not only do their respective multiplicities allow individuals to judge their possible collaboration, D and G also believe that they allow individuals the opportunity to determine “the inspiration of one by the other” (127). When compared to other similarities between philosophy and science (their specific relation to creation and experimentation, the “I do not know” feeling that is included in each, etc.), it seems as though this particular similarity is the least concrete. Understanding this parallel between philosophy and science involves having a proper conception of both the functive and the plane of reference. However, by drawing these types of connections between philosophy and science, we will no doubt be able to better understand each of them individually. Their similarities (in addition to their differences) will provide us with a foundation as we further explore philosophy.
We have insisted in reading D and G as table-thumpers on the differences between modes of thought (e.g., phil. and sci.). It's interesting that they seem to be hinting at similarities now. Of course, over and above more trivial similarities (i.e., parallel structure), suggestions of an overlapping of structure seems to me most curious. At the most fundamental level this would imply some sort of heterogeneous intertwining of the planes in which each (heretofore assumed distinct) mode of thought confronts the chaos of the virtual. Would this not be a mere return to the absolute pre-philosophical plane (i.e., would not a collection of these planes of thought become over-saturated by the infinite and fade into the chaos of the virtual? Perhaps more will be said in the conclusion.
ReplyDeleteI am curious too about how different, analogously structures, planes would interact. It seems as though by definition, these planes exist virtually side by side or on top of each other rather than coexisting as they have different functions.
ReplyDeleteI wonder if the landscape of the plane of reference and the plane of immanence would look similar given the time in which it exists given that both necessarily correspond to the world. But maybe I am thinking of this correspondence between the abstract plane and the real world as closer than it really is.
The sudden connection between science and philosophy that D&G present is indeed interesting, especially in light of how they remained so poised on making the two subjects distinct in the earlier chapters. Though, like Ben said, our tendency thus far from reading D&G is to divorce science from philosophy in almost every way. While the purposes of both science and philosophy are in fact different, the do share apparent similarities which you accurately note. I’m interested, however, with what Ben said about the two “overlapping”. I think is a danger that D&G would want us to avoid. Clearly, the two subjects share different purposes (i.e POI vs. POR), meaning that the study of the two, although sharing similarities, must be done in the proper context of their purposes as laying out concepts and describing function. Thus, I don’t think there is room for overlap in the two subjects, despite the similarities which exist in their respective methodologies.
ReplyDeleteChapter 6 seems to speak on the point of science and philosophy interacting in the mode of logic. It's funny how science and philosophy seemed to be incompatible in a certain sense according to D&G. I feel as though its not that science and philosophy overlap but that their parts interact in logic.
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