I wanted to try to further articulate the point I was trying to make in class the other day about the relationship between the partial observer and the conceptual persona. This is what I am taking away from the text, so please tell me if I am misunderstanding.
We have, I think, established that the conceptual persona, while a "life," is also a tool which the philosopher uses to create concepts which solve problems. The partial observer is a "force" which is also a sort of tool. While the identities of the conceptual persona and the partial observer are not completely separate from the philosopher or scientist, they can each be "let loose," as it were, in order to solve problems in the appropriate way.
A useful way to phrase things might be to say that the conceptual persona's job is to think, while the partial observer's job is to experience or perceive. This distinction is, as we noted, not absolute. And each entity, or whatever we call it, is also a part of the system it is analyzing. These entities function in different ways because philosophy and science solve problems differently. Philosophy is syntagmatic, science is paradigmatic.
I think that what was being objected to was the "passivity" of the partial observer. But the partial observer isn't passive so much as receptive. The partial observer observes and takes in everything around it on the plane of reference, funneling this data into the system in the form of functives. It is actively taking in information.
This is what seems to be the "point" of the partial observer. Just as the conceptual persona allows the philosopher to assume a role in order to think in ways that she otherwise would be unable to, the partial observer allows the scientist to operate on the plane of reference, divesting him of normative claims or conceptual ways of thinking and allowing him to view the plane as a set of coordinates, out of which the functives come.
Professor Johnson seemed to resist this description; I'm wondering what a more accurate account would look like. I don't think we're saying that the conceptual persona is somehow more "active" or "living" than the partial observer, unless we simply want to say that concepts are more important than functives, which I don't think D and G want to do. The partial observer is still very much a subject of experience, but that experience is interpretation rather than construction (maybe?).
Reading chapter 6 for Tuesday I came across this passage (pg. 140): "Thought as such produces something INTERESTING when it accedes to the infinite movement that frees it from truth as supposed paradigm and reconquers an immanent power of creation." So perhaps D and G ARE saying that philosophy is more important than science.
ReplyDeleteIn regards to your comment, Austin, I think you’re right to point out the bias D & G give philosophy over science. Granted they are philosophers, so naturally they show inclination to the philosophy and its purpose in creating of concepts on a basis of interest However, I don’t think their intentions are to trump science with philosophy on the basis of philosophy being more “interesting” than science. I think D & G are focused more on how philosophy is driven (through the conceptual personae) by matters of interest, which the CP help direct on the plane of immense. Thus I feel as if D&G are concerned less with proving philosophies “superiority” to science and more intent on demonstrating how, indeed, it is the philosopher’s “interest” which drives the CP as the primary mover of concepts on the POI.
ReplyDeleteIt also seems clear to me that D and G aren't attempting to subordinate the role of science to philosophy: "Thinking is thought through concepts, or functions, or sensations and no one of these thoughts is better than another..." (198). Indeed, both seem to be merely distinct approaches to affronting the chaos of the virtual. And yet, this difficulty of picking apart the CP of philosophy and the observer of science is genuine. One point to keep in mind is the concession that these purportedly distinct approaches to thought contain their own sort of overlap, D and G relate that "the three thoughts intersect and intertwine but without synthesis or identification (198)" which might mean that parallels between each mode of though may run close enough to evade substantial distinction. Nevertheless, denial of identification seems to entail some difference, if only thin traces. One of living/non-living would be quite substantial; perhaps that of Austin's receptive/not-as-receptive is more on the right track. In any event, this kind of subtlety would be supported by the text.
ReplyDeleteThe receptive/active distinction seems to be better than the passive/active distinction we made in class last time. However, I am hesitant to say that the conceptual personae "thinks" but rather embodies the concepts as put forth by the philosopher. The conceptual personae is autonomous insofar as it exists outside the philosopher herself but cannot individually make a movement forward outside of it's prescribed identity.
ReplyDeleteThe thinking, then, would be on the part of the person analyzing the conceptual personae, applying it to different thought experiments. The partial observer, on the other hand, seems like a thinking as it must account for the information it is receiving.
I think D&G emphasis resisting placing philosophy above science as much as resisting placing science above philosophy. I like the distinction of receptive vs active as well; I think relating the two modes to each other brings us a better understanding of each on its own.
ReplyDeleteI continue to struggle with your conception of both figures as "tools". It is important to note that D&G never describe either of them as such. You state, first, that, "the conceptual persona, while a "life," is also a tool which the philosopher uses to create concepts which solve problems". I still don't see where you make this connection. It seems that D&G want to characterize the CP as something apart from and out of the control of the Philosopher. Its autonomy makes it, by definition not a tool.
ReplyDeleteSimilarly, you state that "The partial observer is a "force" which is also a sort of tool." From whence comes this connection? D&G, as I have stated don't call the PO a "tool", so it must have something to do with the connection between "force" and "tool" in the context of the book. I can't bridge that gap, personally. What makes a "force" a "tool"? Gravity is a force, but not a tool. Violence is a force, but not necessarily a tool. No, I think that this "force" is not a tool in the context of "What is Philosophy?". Its distance and independence from the scientist is an important part of their argument -- one that would fall apart if the PO was merely a "tool".