PhilosoFantastic!

I think the area in which this class helped me the most is differentiating between true philosophical concepts and mere opinions. Sometimes we propose something when talking about a philosophical theory and don’t realize that we may just be speaking about a subjective experience that has little to do with the particular concept we are talking about. There have been many times, including the reading of Deleuze and Guattari, when I have found myself totally disagreeing with whatever author we happen to be reading until I have a strong grasp of their whole theory. Usually when this occurs I find myself agreeing much more than not with the theories, and found what philosophers proposes to be much closer to what I believe than I originally thought. I think there are many times when our conversations took a strong tangent because an idea was brought up that, while interesting, didn’t really apply to the theory we were discussing. I think there are also times when we have long disagreements that turn out to be just differences of word use and vocabulary. It almost feels like the more philosophy I do the more complicated it gets and the harder it is to find the words to convey my actual thoughts. While I might find it easier to differentiate between opinions and concepts, I have found myself being more plagued by differences of vocabulary and such. I have had extensive conversations in which myself and my interlocutor have thought we were disagreeing, but by the end of it discover that we actually agree. Too often do we find an issue with a small point or phrase and then ignore the rest of what someone is trying to say because we can’t get past that point. I found this when reading D&G however once I had finished the book and looked back at certain problems I had I found them to be elementary. Once I was able to grasp the greater mission of their text I was able to understand the smaller points they made from their own perspective.

I want to talk about our senior projects as well. I really enjoyed everyone’s papers (even those I thought I wouldn’t) and I loved the variety of topics we covered. We all had complex yet well thought out ideas; I just wish we had had more time to discuss them! I also wish we could’ve had more class discussions about our papers while we were writing them. It took us a lot of effort to convey what we really wanted to say to each other, but by the banquet we were spot on. Good job guys!

Dear Classmates,

This past semester has been interesting to say the least, but looking back at the tough weeks we all encountered I am proud of our class and our finished products. I think this is where I want to focus my attention- the struggle that led us to the end. To sugar coat our experience in senior seminar would allow us to look past the tough spots we all encountered. Maybe I am being too general here, but at some point I assume we were all ready to throw up our hands. We started off with difficult material that was completely different from anything we had read in the past. The abstract language, new ideas, and dense writing forced us to slow down and critically addresses the questions that were bring brought about by the material. It would have been easy to brush these concerns to the side, and keep pressing forward without a clear idea of how the argument was being constructed. If we were to overlook our questions or our concerns about the material, we would have failed to grasp the ideas. At the time, I was so frustrated. I didn’t have much to say in class, because when reviewing what I read I was never sure what I understood about it. But my point is not to show the distraught, but how the struggle led to me fully understanding the material and introducing me to a new way of looking at philosophy. I have referred to D and G’s ideas about the concept’s uniqueness to philosophy, philosophy’s comparison to art and science, and the structure of each of these formations of thought many times. It altered the way I viewed our field of study, and I am glad we slowly pressed through till the end.
I think our struggle with D and G reiterates the importance of perseverance. If this semester would have been easy, I don’t think I would appreciate the diploma I (hopefully) will be receiving in two weeks. The question of whether I can make it to the end or if I want to make it to the end has been debatable, but now being close to finished I appreciate that this semester has been fight. As we approach the real world I think these little fights will be a reoccurrence, and we may not always have the known reward waiting at the end of it all. But it is important to remember these times, and know that the hard work at some point does pay off whether or not we recognize it. Anyway, I am proud to be graduating with an intelligent group of students that have worked for our diplomas. Congratulations! Thank you Dr. J for making this semester memorable and believing in us these past four years.

Best of luck,
Courtney Martin

Final thoughts senior sem

My experience in this class has really helped me grow in philosophy more than most other classes I have taken. It was a valuable experience to be able to write on whatever subject I wished and get insight on possible flaws with my reasoning. My experience during this class was unique because I was not simply learning some dead philosophers beliefs and applying them to things like the ethical implications of torture or the ethics in the series Torchwood. I believe that this class was the first one where we were actually doing philosophy and not simply the history of philosophy. I think that it was a valuable experience that properly ends our education. I believe it was nice to gain insight into the different presentations that were made. After getting past the D&G we were really able to open up and start philosophy. I learned a lot about the philosophy of art and the art experience as well with this class.
One of the possible problems addressed to my senior seminar is the idea that holding a belief without material evidence based on certain criteria would allow almost any belief. Like a belief in Santa Claus or fairies could be justified if it somehow met the criteria. I was hesitant at first to say this in class however any one of those beliefs are justified so long as it is beneficial and they are not delusional beliefs. So long as the belief cannot be solved on intellectual grounds and the option is momentous, living, and forced holding that belief is justified Holding different beliefs in Gods or fairies is no different than holding different religious beliefs. So long as those beliefs are beneficial a person can consider them true. Some people may criticize it for allowing so many different beliefs like that however it is no different than the differing religions in the world. Some may have a problem with allowing those beliefs, but they have to keep in mind that those beliefs can be of the same rationality as all religious beliefs. I believe that I demonstrated the benefits of religion as well showing that it can be justified. Religion has been used to inspire thoughts and movements which have been beneficial to society and has helped people on a personal level that can be directly observed. I believe that religion is an aspect of our life that seems to be forgotten by philosophers nowadays and my work on the presentation showed me how philosophical those beliefs actually are. I thought I should clear up that little aspect of my senior sem presentation.

Sport and Society

Peter Arnold discusses the relationship between sport and society in his article Democracy, Education, and Sport. “Democracy,” according to Arnold, is a form of government that is fundamentally based on freedom, human dignity, and equality (Holowchak 484). Arnold asserts that democracy also serves as a “sociocultural, a moral, way of life in which persons are free to associate in various ways and to express their mature interests and concerns” (Holowchak 486). In order to participate in a democratic life, Arnold explains that individuals must pursue a liberal education. Because it avoids narrow specialization and demands individuals to exercise their intellectual abilities, Arnold believes that a liberal education transforms individuals for the better and teaches them how to properly approach life (Holowchak 486). Rationality and morality, the two strands of liberal education, have significant implications for the individuals in a democratic society. Arnold explains that sound decisions develop from rational judgment, as opposed to passion, prejudice, or uninformed opinion (Holowchak 486). In addition, the reasoned criticism and review of public policy that stems from rationality is essential to democratic ideals and prosperity. Morality, in particular, concerns the “values and principles to which reference can be made before making a decision or engaging upon a particular course of action” (Holowchak 488). Morality involves a consideration and concern for our own interests and the welfare of other individuals. Together, rationality and morality constitute a specific type of education that allows individuals to successfully protect democratic ideals.

Arnold separates rationality into two distinct categories: theoretical reasoning, which includes the subjects of mathematics, science, and history, and practical reasoning, which incorporates activities such as dance, pottery, and sport. Practical reasoning, as opposed to theoretical reasoning, is concerned with individual action in the world, rather than merely providing information or speculating about the world (Holowchak 489). Arnold argues that knowing how to participate in a range of physical pursuits is an important aspect of human development; practical reasoning “provides an individual with the opportunity to become a more completely rounded person” and “permits an individual the freedom to choose…between the inherent values of different types of activity” (Holowchak 489). Sporting practices, among the other types of practical reasoning, provide opportunities for an individual to exercise particular virtues in the form of justice, honesty, and courage. In addition, Arnold believes that the universal and impartial rules of sport foster and shape the principle of equality (Holowchak 490). Like democracy and education, sport contributes to the structuring of society; it operates within a context of what is fair and just. In light of the increasing number individuals who see sport as a significant part of social and cultural development, Arnold encourages developed democracies to integrate the right to take part in cultural life into social policies. The government should be responsible for the provision of sport “on a fair and equitable basis” because this activity provides the means for individuals to become more complete and responsible members of a community (Holowchak 491).

McKenna Animal Ethics

Mckenna notion of truth is one that rejects classic notions of truth in favor of a truth that evolves throughout time as the situation changes. Right and wrong has the ability to change based on the context at which it is presented. Her criticism of PETA for attempting to demand a renaming of pets to non-human companions, and her criticism of over humanizing pets demonstrates that there is not a system of laws that can completely protect and articulate animal rights in a moving system. She seems to take a very Aristotelian take on animals ethics arguing that we need to find a mean between the anthropomorphizing animals and the treatment of them as things.
McKenna argued that dogs and cattle have evolved to be of use to humans or at the very least require an interaction with humans to survive. She mentions that dogs are evolved to interact and communicate with humans better than their wolf counterparts and have been used by humans for thousands of years. She uses this to demonstrate that humans as social animals interact with other animals in order to survive, and through this interaction both species evolve to be of use to one another. In fact I would find it hard to believe that cattle could survive for very long without the assistance of humans. I do realize however that while this is an effective argument for not dismissing the use of all animals PETA can still object to McKenna by arguing that humans should stop interacting with new species of animals because they are not evolved in a way to work with humans. This would require us to respect the rights of exotic animals. In addition PETA could also object to McKenna by arguing that our use of animals does more harm and suffering to the animal than it does good. If there is a clear side benefitting at the expense of the other then humans would not be in a community with the animals, the animals are merely being exploited. PETA’s argument against the use of animals is because by nature humans seem to be exploiting these animals. If this is the case then PETA would have a very pragmatic case against McKenna’s position. To this McKenna tries to demonstrate that we need to move back the mean between anthropomorphizing animals and treating animals as things to prevent things like factory farming. This would reduce the exploitation of animals without having to do things like try to rename fish sea kittens (no really PETA tried to). One thing I think is the use of animals is something that is a part of human nature and cannot be escaped. There is no absolute that can be taken to avoid this.
I also find McKenna Feminist pragmatism to be different from many other pragmatists. While most pragmatists would argue that one should find a position that is the most beneficial for all parties McKenna tries to make people change their position as dominant over other species. This would mean that even if we want to help the animals we cannot treat them as things completely because it would eventually defeat the purpose and lead to the further exploitation of the animals.

Erin McKenna Lecture: The Benefits of the Eco-Feminine Perspective

Professor’s Erin McKenna’s lecture on Thursday addressed the current misconception of human involvement with all other animal. As a devout pragmatist, McKenna used Dewey’s means-end-continuum to show how we can better understand our connection with animals, and how recognizing these commonalities will create an ameliorated animal ethic. McKenna argued that we as human must consider ourselves as part of the “animal kingdom”. Though we as humans have different characteristics from most other animals, we nonetheless fall under the same genus of animals. We should therefore spend less time trying to figure out how animals live, how they can fulfill human ends, and more time figuring out how we (as animals) relate to each other. With this in mind, the more we see ourselves as intertwined with other all animals the less we ought to embrace an over-anthropomorphic view of animals. The problem with sticking to an over-anthropomorphic view of animals is that often elevate ourselves as the dominant animal, which falsely validates why humans can view all other animal “instrumentally”. As an advocate of “pet” ownership, however, McKenna was intent on clarifying how animals cannot be considered as “things”. This approach to animal ethics reinforces the instrumental view of animals as “ends” for humankind. Animals thus become the means for human ends rather than ends in and of themselves.

Last semester I took Prof. Terj’s class on Environmental Ethics. We read a few articles by McKenna; one of which attacking the use if on factory farming and the other an eco-feminine approach to animal ethics. Of course both articles, not to mention her lecture, where motivated by pragmatic understanding of animal ethics. One of the points she reiterated in her lecture was how pragmatist recognize their own fallibility. In general, the pragmatist would dismiss what William James might call “supposed necessities” and use the rule of fallibility helping reshape an undersigning humankind kind. But what I found most appealing in McKenna’s philosophy is how she employs an eco-feminine perspective to animal ethics. The advantage of an eco-feminine perspective helps reassess what we as humans are missing in our approach to animal ethic. The eco-feminist perspective encourages humans to abandon the “dominant”, anthropomorphic view of animals. Instead it appeals to the interest of all animals, which we as humans should embrace as being part of the animal kingdom. Thus, if the eco-famine can indeed teach more about our involvement with animals, it is that our relationships with animals are more intimate and transformative than they are instrumental. Only in abandoning the anthropomorphic view are we as humans then able to consider the needs and interest of all other animals.

Erin McKenna Lecture Thoughts

I was a bit confused by Dr. McKenna's ethic, as it seems to undermine itself a bit.  If this is a pragmatic ethic, then the classical notion of truth is ignored in favor of what works in helping people to relate to one another and society better, right?  Well, Dr. McKenna seemed to be saying that we should realize no system of laws or regulations could ever sufficiently stop the ethical violations she's concerned with.  Realistic?  Probably.  But what effect will the acceptance of that truth have on the people attempting to create the laws and regulations?  I think this would probably lead them to accept a certain degree of "inevitable casualties" inherent in an imperfect system, and this seems like a very dangerous slope to slip down.  Pragmatically, wouldn't it be better to just tell people that we can create sufficiently expansive or effective laws, and let them keep trying to better them?  Why should we realize that no laws will ever be good enough?  She says that this will allow opposing sides to work together, but I don't realize how that will necessarily happen.  I may not be understanding her talk, and I definitely don't have a firm grasp of pragmatic thought, but that's one of the problems I saw.

Missing Something

Here's a section from my paper.  I have a suspicion that I'm missing something obvious here.  If someone sees it, let me know.


 An act’s appropriateness or rightness, rather than being determined by a single factor, relies almost entirely on context in its evaluation.  While consequences may be considered, they are not the exclusive determining factor.  So an act may be considered moral or right if it is done in a right way, for the right reasons, with the right object, at the right time, or perhaps any combination of these or more elements.  Aristotle’s is perhaps the most famous example of a system of this kind.  But what determines the rightness of a certain action in certain circumstances?  I suppose that this could be determined by social codes or subjective notions, but there seems an overarching principle lying behind such possibilities to the effect of, “you should obey social codes, etc.”  But if this is internal to the system, just another social code, as it were, it provides no outside justification for adhering to the system.  A person must therefore, for no moral reason, decide to willingly place herself within the subjective justificatory system.  What sort of reason would she have, then, to perform certain kinds of moral action if not a moral reason?  One could, of course, argue that it is a pragmatic consideration, and that it is simply easier or that it works practically.  Then the ground of the morality of the system is either non-moral, which seems impossible, or morality is defined as that which works best (understood in a practical sense) in a certain situation.  The Stoics are perhaps most closely allied with this view, stating that one should act according to the law of nature.  Things are designed to run smoothly in a certain way, and one should go along with the flow of the universe, in a sense, without resisting.  This is virtue (arête).

Musings

is paper will consist, broadly, of an exploration of critical race theory in America. In more specific terms, I intent to connect some of the ideas and problems which CR theorists have highlighted as defining the schism which is apparent in the modern, post-enlightenment Western world. In this paper I will attempt to inquire into some of the presuppositions which have helped to shape the underlying assumptions of philosophy and, to a greater extent, modern western society as it has developed. In particular, it would seem fruitful to me to research and explicate on some of the enlightenment thinkers and give context for their opinions and claims.

These critical thinkers were fundamental in shaping various essences which are commonly taken to be the basic properties of humankind. Though it may be a bit difficult to correlate, I would like to move from this to an analysis of racism within the United States specifically. There are, for various reasons, many different misconceptions which have mangled the profound scholarship which came about at this time (the enlightenment) - some of which are perpetuated today. In diagnosing some of the basic assumptions which grew to separate the various groups of people in this time, we can see the bane which still plagues America to this day.

What Does Race Accomplish?

In my paper I want to explore race the idea that it is a social construction. Most of us would agree that race has no biological foundation outside of physical ethnic characteristics. Instead it is a combination of factors that include appearance, ancestry, experience, culture and perceived community membership. Not only does one’s ancestry come into account, but whether one is aware of it and whether the public is aware of it. In one sense, an individual identifies for themselves what community they are a part of; but in another sense, it can be an identity that is pushed on him or her by other people. The race one identifies with can even be different than what the public identifies that person as. Appiah believed that they was no term that could do for us all the things we try to make race do and I think he was right in that assertion. There are numerous factors that go into deciding someone’s race and even considering all these factors together sometimes doesn’t give a clear indication of what race an individual belongs to. In his book Blackness Visible, Charles Mills identifies seven different factors that go into a person’s racial identity and showed how even when you can identify all the factors, a person’s race may still be elusive. I think, like Appiah, that we have made race too broad of a category; including appearance, experience, culture, and ancestry in one is a messy business and leads to much confusion. If the concept of race we identify today is so complex and flawed then why do we even use it still? Most people seem ready to admit that race is flawed yet we do not abandon the system. What do we gain by keeping a system as flawed as this so prominent in our conception society and the world? I think that, for the most part, it leads people to jump to incorrect conclusions and negatively affects how we interact on a day to day basis. While I suppose that there are different communities that make up the larger society, separating people by race only encourages and forces social separations. Even when we find little instances in which our conception of race works out, they are still vastly outweighed by the instances in which racial considerations lead to injustice and inequality.

The Ethics of the Baseball Code

In his book “Philosophy of Sport,” Drew Hyland introduces a wide range of practical and theoretical issues that incorporate sociological, psychological, and philosophical themes. Hyland argues that, alongside politics, religion, music, and the arts, sport should be considered a legitimate subject of philosophical inquiry. The philosophy of sport, in particular, is a relatively new development within the realm of philosophy. Hyland explains that many great philosophers have discussed sport in their works (Plato, Aristotle, and Nietzsche), but that they usually treated sport as an example of a larger point or as a metaphor for a larger issue being addressed (xvi). It wasn’t until the 20th century that philosophers turned their attention directly to sport as a theme for philosophical investigation. Although the philosophy of sport covers a wide variety of topics, including the relationship between sport and society, mind and body in sport, and sport and self knowledge, this area of philosophy places the greatest emphasis on the ethics of sport. Hyland believes that the philosophy of sport must address the issue concerning the “overemphasis on winning” in sport, which elevates with the levels of competition. Unfortunately, competitive sports encourage participants to treat their opponents as “the enemy,” or someone they must dominate. Hyland explains that this type of activity creates alienation between both players and teams, an issue he considers the most significant in sport. Hyland also discusses the issue of drug use within sport, which he believes has a positive correlation with the level of competition.

Because I have participated in baseball throughout my life and on every level short of professional, it is the particular sport I plan to investigate in my term paper. An individual who watches or follows baseball will probably notice that players, coaches, and umpires follow certain rules or guidelines. For example, all players must use some type of protective helmet while at bat and all players on a team must wear uniforms identical in color, trim and style. These types of rules are provided by Major League Baseball and are considered the “written” rules of baseball. If an individual participates in baseball, however, he gains the opportunity to experience an entirely different set of rules. These separate rules are considered the “unwritten” rules of baseball because they are not in the rulebook and are primarily learned through playing the game. The collection of unwritten rules, also known as the baseball “code,” is divided into two categories: the first set is designed to promote sportsmanship (these rules explain when it is appropriate to run, swing, etc.) and the second set is designed to enforce the first set (these rules explain when it is appropriate to throw at a batter, provide a hard tag, etc.). My term paper will investigate the morality of the unwritten rules of baseball using specific virtues provided in Aristotle’s ethics, including courage, fortitude, prudence, justice, and temperance. In order to determine whether or not the activities in baseball are ethical, it is necessary to determine the morality of its players based on varying situations. Because the values of society are reflected in sport, I hope to gain knowledge of these values during my investigation into the ethics of the baseball code.

Nature and Chaos: One in the Same?

In taking up the subject of philosophical taste as a capacity to judge the beautiful, I find it altogether difficult to part ways from a Kantian perspective. But as the case with almost all of Kant’s philosophy, you’re enticed by his philosophy as much as you are repulsed. Granted his examples (particularly that in art) are meager and lacking in any real substance, but he compensates so well through his thorough explanations that read more scientific than they do philosophical. I don’t mean “scientific” in actual sense, but rather from Kant’s astute, methodical observations of “nature” that characterize his philosophy. The mere fact that he was able to publish three volumes on the subject philosophy is symbolic enough of his immense understanding the human mind. I mean, whether you disagree with him or not, the fact remains how he singlehandedly revolutionized modern philosophy – undoubtedly so, too.

The more I trek through the Third Critique, the more I realize how influential – to an almost inescapable degree – his philosophy has been even amidst those hailed as the more contemporary of thinkers. Such is evidenced is our reading of What is Philosophy by Deleuze and Guattari. The most sticking similarity I’ve come to find between Kantian philosophy and D&G’s distinction between the three modes of thinking lies is found in their respective understanding of art. In particular, the similarity between nature and chaos. For Kant, nature is our apparatus for understanding everything that “exist” in time and space. All things sensible come from nature and our intuitions are a product of nature’s being, more or less, constantly upon us. In application to aesthetics, nature is where we find/discover beauty. The simple pleasures and pains which arise from nature presenting itself to us thus become the basis for our “liking” of beauty and moreover ground the subjectivity of our empirical encounter with nature. What we call beautiful, therefore, derives from our “disinterested” – perhaps better phrased “neutral”—pleasure which nature invokes from us. Our capacity for making this pleasure known is called taste, and everyone has taste. The artist, then, to whom nature has given a certain, ability, skill, or talent (denoted as genius), is the one who can effectively communicate taste through means of nature.

The same is true of the aesthetic figure in art. In art’s struggle with chaos (nature?), at a certain moment it is able to extract from chaos, in the form of a chaoid compound, a pure sensation that is able is capable of standing up on its own. The astonishing similarity I find between Kant’s imagination, where nature presents itself to us via the senses, and D&G’s understanding of art is that way in which both extract from the world private sensations that can be communicated as something universal. In this way chaos and nature are one in the same. They both inexplicably yield sensations to us which that we the capable of communicating to the world via art. Thus, I honestly think you’re right, Austin, the aesthetic figure is to chaos as the genius is to nature. So it seems, at least.

This is Genius: http://www.nowness.com/day/2011/3/18/1371/sebastian--embody

Religion and Transcendence

Deleuze and Guattari say that philosophy is the creation of concepts on a plane of immanence.  They see philosophy as on a distinct and equal playing field from science and art, but I see the philosophical process as more basic and reject the notion of absolute immanence.  The point that Dr. J made in class about the transcendence of other people was a good one.  An interaction with some sort of transcendence is an everyday thing.  I set up a relationship between science, philosophy, and religion, making a place for transcendence.  In my meta-paper, I suggest that philosophy is the human attempt to understand the world through reason.  But one cannot live on reason alone.  Reason can show us the world, but it cannot get inside of it.  As a child, I was fascinated by opening and closing the refrigerator door.  I would open the door and the light would come on.  I would close the door and the light would turn off.  I always tried to catch a glimpse of the darkened inside of the refrigerator when I closed the door, but I never could, because the door was in the way, and my angle of vision could never get beyond it.  Even if the light went out, it wouldn’t be the same as seeing the inside of the refrigerator with the door closed, clear plastic and cold and darkness.  Science is the same.  It can take things apart, but it can never get inside of them.  We can analyze the brain, but we can never be another person.  We must take the leap of faith to climb the mountain of transcendence.  This is what religion does.  Religion transcends the rational bumping up against things and gets inside of them.  It seeks a direct communication with fundamental reality.  We trust that we know now what lies behind the door.  Science lies alongside philosophy, but religion subsumes it.

Deleuze and Guattari

Although Deleuze and Guattari present an organized and detailed description of the relationship between the three forms of thought—philosophy, science, and art—a number of questions stem from their characterization of philosophy. According to Deleuze and Guattari, philosophy in its “purest” form is not influenced by the activities that dominate the social arena; contemplation, reflection, and communication are unable to assist the philosopher as (s)he attempts to create the concept. In addition to the philosopher’s detachment from other individuals, Deleuze and Guattari explain that the creation of the concept is a single event that cannot be replicated. Similarly, the plane of immanence, which develops out of an individual’s knowledge of particular concepts and the culmination of his/her own experiences, is specific to each individual. If philosophy requires such independence and is unable to provide consistent events and planes of immanence, how can philosophy contain any amount of objective truth? Deleuze and Guattari explain that only science is concerned with the value of claims and propositions; philosophy searches for solutions to problems, rather than the truth. Should an individual then approach the chaos as a scientist, or would it be more beneficial to search for solutions to the problems that plague society? This description of philosophy directly contrasts with the accurate notion concerning philosophy’s relation to truth: the individuals who participate in philosophy are eventually exposed to objective truth.

The description of the concept that Deleuze and Guattari provide also stimulates a number of questions. After an individual has placed himself in such a position so that the concept is able to “reveal” itself, it is still unclear whether or not (s)he will become the means for the creation of a particular concept. Potentially, an individual could satisfy all of the necessary “requirements” for the creation of a concept without a concept coming even remotely close enough for the individual to grasp. In addition to this problem, the window of opportunity that the individual has to create a concept is limited. Deleuze and Guattari explain that the concept (as a “layer” of the brain subject) is incredibly fragile. Old age creates objective disconnections and disintegrations that prevent individuals from maintaining the infinite speeds of the chaos. Eventually, the concepts that the individual has accumulated throughout his/her lifetime will begin to disintegrate into separate components. Individuals who are near the end of their lives slowly move back into the chaos outside of the plane of immanence and are forced to rely on ready-made opinion (214). Deleuze and Guattari explain that philosophy only comes together in “the moment of grace between life and death” (1). Hence, the philosopher must struggle not only with opinion and chaos, but also with time. How can the individual who aspires to become a philosopher remain optimistic when faced with such an intimidating challenge? Philosophy, then, must be a mode of thought that is available to the individual regardless of his/her specific age.

Philosophies goal should be the pursuit of Logical prospects

Shouldn’t the final goal of philosophy be the formation of opinions. D&G argue that opinions are the enemies of thinking because it does not allow for variation needed for thinking. However once a concept has been thoroughly tested why is it so wrong to try and formulate an opinion. The original idea of philosophy was to find the ideal of truth. Plato’s cave was telling people to find the absolute truth. After escaping the cave the person who saw the truth would try to communicate it with those still stuck in the cave. Granted the people in the cave would not believe him but regardless. The goal of philosophy was to find an absolute truth, one that required no further contemplation. So why can’t one form an opinion? Why can’t one form a concept into a prospect? If one can create a cohesive functional system to shield against the chaos it would seem that they had fulfilled the role of philosophy. At a certain point it seems pointless to continue to contemplate certain philosophical ideas. You would form a logical concept at a certain point so you can contemplate some other philosophical ideal. If the beginnings of philosophy were the pursuit of truth, you cannot make a truth statement if you leave things open ended. The goal of philosophy should be the creation of a set of logical statements that work in a cohesive statement. It should continue to be a pursuit of an absolute truth, or at the very least a truth that shield one from the chaos.

In addition I have a problem with the conceptual personae. It does not seem logical for the character to be completely autonomous. Even Descartes was able to stop the idiot from doubting away everything. The idiot’s goal was to doubt everything. However Descartes was able to prevent the Idiot from doubting away what thinking was, he was able to hang on to opinions that the CP was unable to penetrate. Descartes was able to hang on to conceptions of God and other things to escape his solipsistic hole. The fact that the philosopher could create boundaries makes the cp more of a tool than an autonomous agent. Cp don’t usually take the philosopher just anywhere they are usually at least partially bound by the philosophers already prevalent beliefs. This is why Hegel did not differ that much from Kant, James did not differ that much from Pierce. The conceptual Personae is bound by opinions, thoughts, and beliefs already present in the philosopher. Because of this we do not usually see radical change in philosophic thought all the time. Philosophy usually just builds on top of previous philosophies. There are cases of radical change in philosophy however those cases are rare. I could argue that the philosophers who do cause radical change only do so because they may have experienced something that makes that philosophy inconsistent with some ideas they already hold. So they attempt to create a brand new system. It is like how religion and the idea of God often influence whether or not a philosopher will buy into certain systems.

appropriation as a facet of becoming in art

Deleuze and Guatarri begin their chapter on art, percept, affect and concept, with a characterization of an artwork frozen in time, independent of "whoever was breathing that day." If philosophy moves at infinite speed and science is a slowing down as to fix points of reference, then art "preserves and is preserved." This preservation is dependent upon the autonomy of the work of art which is made possible only by the viewer who "only experience [the work of art] after." But what is actually preserved is not what one has seen but rather "a bloc of sensations, that is to say, a compound of percepts and affects." The work of art not only instantiates an aesthetic encounter, but offers up an experience that holds long after the encounter has passed. While D & G do not give an account of what makes for good or bad art, in order to properly be identified as artwork, it would have to accomplish this task of preservation.

Thus, the work of art is contingent upon it's physical existence insofar as it is the vehicle by which one may look at and with the artwork. What has happened to the viewer then, is not merely an experience marginalized by it's duration but rather a kind of reminiscence posited by the mind. The combination of the physical thing (whether that be music, visual art, literature or otherwise) with one's aesthetic understanding of the natural world combined with the dramatic intention of the artist will hopefully yield a work that is "a being sensation and nothing else" existing in and of itself. It is the task of the viewer then to further appropriate their feelings about the art encountered in order to create lasting impressions, in a way, feelings that can be conjured in the mind without the presence of the work of art itself. These feelings are called affects and percepts as they are in a way derivative of the visceral affections and perceptions felt upon viewing.

Thus, the task of the work of art both to participate and instantiate a process of appropriation. this appropriation could be of objects, methods, components, feelings, techniques or ideas; but it seems to me that D & G are hinting at a kind territorializing and deterritorializing in order to make the work of art stand alone, in and of itself. This explanation seems to be a surrogate for "appropriation" which, I believe, is inherent to the creative process.

Paris Je T'aime

Upon reading chapter 7 of What is Philosophy I must say that D&G’s discussion of art is in many regards more fulfilling than even their previous chapters on philosophy and science. While philosophy and science helps “reconceptualize” our understanding of concepts and functions, art helps make sense of human emotion/sensation through the lens of percepts and affects. It is interesting to me how D&G seem to devote closer attention to the subject of art in particular than they do P&S.

Now, obviously they spend more time in the text tackling the differences between philosophy and science, so what I mean to say is how the definition and explication of art that they impart the reader is one that is highly refined. Perhaps it’s the nature of the apparent bias (and I don’t use this word in a pejorative sense) the French have towards art that inspired the rich content of D&G’s own understanding of art. Consequently, I’m more inclined to think of D&G as authorities on art more so than philosophy (all doctorates and publications aside). I mean, lets face it, Memphis is not Paris; and neither is New York City (sorry Kip and Ben), so it makes sense how D&G conception of art is almost inextricable from their own upbringing.

If you think about it, Paris is one of the few cities in the world that is simply exudes art. It leaves one feeling the rawness of human passion and emotion, incomparable to that of any other place on earth. Its almost like the city itself can be characterized by the same qualities of D&G’s own definition of art, as a constant “being of sensation and nothing else” (164). If you can imagine growing up in a city which itself can be defined as a “compound of percepts and affects” it makes sense to view art in a similar manner to that of D&G. Needless to say, my suggestion of Paris as more or less a personification of art helps make sense of the qualities D&G assign to art (at least id like to think so).

When thinking of the “artist’s greatest difficulty” in making art something that can “stand up on its own” this task can seem daunting. Yet possessing the ability to make art “stand up on its own” is integral to art as the artist can only accomplishes this task by ultimately composing art that goes beyond the “lived”. As D&G write, “In each case style is needed—the writer’s syntax, the musician’s modes and rhythms, the painter’s lines and colors—to raise lived perceptions to the precept and lived affections to the affect” (170). For me, D&G’s chapter on art provides an highly relevant interpretation that bounds art to its creative purposes while validating art all the while as a “bloc of sensations” that supersedes the “lived”.

Methods of Autonomy in Art

Percepts and Affects are born out of perceptions and affections, but unlike the philosophical concept, they preserve themselves apart from their origins. They solidify apart from their beginnings in the raw materials of the art work—color, line, shadow, light. From these they stand up, autonomous, preserve themselves such that they remain even while materials fade away. What more can we say about this process of becoming? Setting aside its nature (i.e. an expression of otherness, a realization of the non-human vague via collapse of the boundary between human subject and other), can we elaborate on the means by which such a nature is attained?

D and G relate three monumental types, three distinct patterns in which sensations stand up as monuments, as autonomous blocs. In each, a single sensation or two display movement of harmony such that they are preserved as percept and affect. The first is vibration, a single sensation that rises and falls, displays differences of level. This sensation is in no way cerebral, but it is rather nervous. The second is the embrace or the clinch, two distinct sensations that resonate so closely as to embrace tightly in a clinch, to seem to become bound by one another, though perhaps still remaining distinct. The Third is withdrawal, division or distention, two sensations that at first seems to be proximal but then draw apart.

What can we make of these descriptions? The latter two suggest that the specific interplay between sensations is what can render the work a genuine piece of art. This seems intuitively true. Often what works particularly well in a piece is contrasting emotions it evokes, such as the juxtaposition of contrasting sentiments in a novel. A satire, e.g., Voltaire’s Candide, can produce in one a pure delight in the piece’s caustic wit, yet this sensation will rely on, be closely intertwined with the painted perception of an impure, sordid philosophy, mocked throughout the interactions of a motley mix of juxtaposed characters (e.g., the naïve/the deceiving, the innocent/the underhanded manipulator, etc.). Here, distinct sensations seem to come together, revealing themselves as much more closely bound than one might originally suspect. The reverse can be equally effective. One of Damien Hirst’s sharks in formaldehyde seems to produce fission rather than fusion. The perceived strength of the deadly predator seems to split into two, as the predator and viewer at once become the prey, i.e., objects of death, as strength falls the inevitable victim of weakness, not merely one of contingent life but of the comprehension of one’s invariable end. The strength and the deadly starkly divides.

What of the first type though? A single sensation that functions not by means of interaction but by solitary movement of level. I’d like to here more said on this if it spoke to anyone.

The Event

I’m still having a little trouble wrapping my head around “the event”, which is funny considering my précis was supposed to explain it. I find I can only describe it using the same words as Deleuze and Guattari; according to them the event “is not part of the eternal, but neither is it part of time—it belongs to becoming.” (158) So basically the event is non- temporal, which is contrary to how we might usually think of an event, however it is part of the birth or becoming of…what? It would seem the event itself, as it is the event that exists between instances, not time. Since the event is no longer temporal, it is a meanwhile, which is to say it has a certain permanence. But all these meanwhiles are put on top of each other and are in zone of indescernibility where they can’t be separated. This is all fine and good I suppose, however later D&G write, “Nothing happens there, but everything becomes, so that the event has the privilege of beginning again when time is past. Nothing happens, and yet everything changes, because becoming continues to pass through its components again and to restore the event that is actualized elsewhere, at a different moment.” (158) Now what in the world are they trying to say here? I have an inkling to what it is; possibly trying to explain how the event can become and yet never change, however this just seems flawed. The idea that nothing happens and everything changes seems like an “A = -A” argument. Later they go on to say the concept that apprehends the event. I suppose it is the concept that links the event to others like it, but D&G don’t say that. They seem to assert that every event of a type are the same event. I understand that we have to try to comprehend D&G within their own system but there gets a point at which it seems I have no choice but to agree with them otherwise their system doesn’t work for me. I don’t believe that their explanation of the event is a very good argument, and it seems a little bit too abstract. In my mind, they’re trying to force temporal things into a non-temporal system. If they had said that each event was individual and temporal and the concept linked together the events of the same type into a “relationship” that was non-temporal, thus making them have a sort of immortality, then I might agree with them, especially cause I bet they would be better at describing it than me. But they don't.

On Chapter 7

Artistic works have a unique ability to become completely independent of the bodies and materials which compose them – and in doing so elevate the power of the work at hand to the level of pure sensation. This transcendent bloc of sensations is completely independent of its creator, instead having been formed through self-preservation of the sensations which arose from the original piece of art. Deleuze and Guattari posit an interesting series of steps for this artistic process, which we shall briefly examine here. First, there must be an artist in whose mind the model of the art to be created is held. The artist must also choose the materials with which the work must be created – not simply the physical materials (clay, paper, etc), but also the perceptions and affections which the artist wishes to relay or manipulate. This pool of materials somehow coalesces into a piece of work which has its own essence, conveyed through the perceptions and affections which are a part of the work. These feelings which are evoked by the work are somehow imbued with a quality which allows them to transcend the physical, material level of the world. Thus, the essential characteristic of the work becomes its transcendent quality, and the perception and affection which first regaled the audience has risen to become an independent, preserved quality. Perceptions become percepts; affections become affects. These are the timeless qualities of art which help it achieve its autonomous state, instead of a dependent state of affectation for the audience of the work.

The result which attains is that the percept and affect are able to preserve the essential qualities of the art through transcendence of the material bodies which compose it (e.g. the ink on the pages of a book, the canvas of a painting). This is because the artwork focuses and posits the key qualities of the piece as being within the artwork itself, thus wresting the power of creation from creator and bestowing it eternally to that which has been created. Thus, Art consists in freezing time, capturing a moment of sensation which is able to transcend the physical features of the artwork itself. This is an interesting juxtaposition with philosophy, which attempts to constantly relate and compare concepts whilst constantly changing the boundaries and internal connections of the concept so as to make it compatible with itself and those concepts around it.

A Similarity Between Philosophy and Science

Deleuze and Guattari highlight the main differences between philosophy and science in Functives and Concepts; the confrontation between philosophy and science “develops under three principle heads of opposition that group the series of functives on one hand and the properties of concepts on the other” (132). One of the major differences between philosophy and science involves their respective modes of enunciation. D and G explain that science brings to light “partial observers” in relation to functions within systems of reference (as opposed to the conceptual personae in relation to fragmentary concepts on the plan of immanence) (128). Partial observers, who are neither inadequate nor subjective, are “points in view of themselves that presuppose a calibration of horizons…on the basis of slowing-downs and acceleration,” whereas conceptual personae function on the basis of infinite speed (132). Another difference that D and G discuss involves the plane of “immanence” or consistency in philosophy and the plane of “reference” in science. By retaining infinite speeds, philosophy’s plane of immanence attempts to “give the virtual a consistency specific to [the virtual]” (118). Science, on the other hand, relinquishes the infinite in order to “gain a reference able to actualize the virtual” (118). The last significant difference between philosophy and science stems from the relationship between the concept and the function; the “unconditioned” concept involves the inseparability of variations while the function involves the independence of variations in relationships that can be conditioned (126). Unlike inseparable variations, which D and G describe as “events” on a plane of immanence, independent variables are “states of affairs” in a system of reference (127).

This third difference, specifically, generates an interesting connection between philosophy and science. D and G explain that “concepts and functions appear as two types of multiplicities or varieties whose natures are different” (127). They contrast the multiplicity of science, which is defined by space, number, and time, to the multiplicity of philosophy, which is expressed by the inseparability of variations. Although the nature of these multiplicities differ, D and G explain that they create a correspondence between philosophy and science; like the coordinates of extensive abscissas in functions, there are multiple internal components within the concept. Not only do their respective multiplicities allow individuals to judge their possible collaboration, D and G also believe that they allow individuals the opportunity to determine “the inspiration of one by the other” (127). When compared to other similarities between philosophy and science (their specific relation to creation and experimentation, the “I do not know” feeling that is included in each, etc.), it seems as though this particular similarity is the least concrete. Understanding this parallel between philosophy and science involves having a proper conception of both the functive and the plane of reference. However, by drawing these types of connections between philosophy and science, we will no doubt be able to better understand each of them individually. Their similarities (in addition to their differences) will provide us with a foundation as we further explore philosophy.

Consistency?

A distinction between philosophy and science is found through their approach to chaos. There are three parts that need to be more thoroughly looked at to fully understand this major difference. First, we must identify a clear definition of chaos. Second, we must look at philosophy’s approach to chaos, and finally move to a description of the scientific approach to disorder. The plane of immanence and the plane of reference help to clarify these approaches to chaos, but this post is going to focus specifically on chaos and the plane of immanence. To create a more clear depiction of their differences, consistency must be considered, and I am having trouble conceiving what this means in relationship to philosophical thought. It is critical to fully understand this first distinction of science and philosophy, because it is foundational for the dissimilarities that follow, and allow for D and G to build a more solid argument.

The recognition of chaos and the management of disarray are critical to understanding why this first difference is foundational to move forward. Immanuel Kant communicates and reiterates D and G’s perspective by stating “God has put a secret into the Forces of Nature so as to enable it to fashion itself out of chaos into a perfect world system.” The primary concern with this statement to D and G are the “forces” that are involved within the reconstruction of chaotic mess. D and G define chaos as “not so much by its disorder [but] by the infinite speed with which every form taking shape in it vanishes” (118). So to further this description, chaos is the state of forms appearing and disappearing at immeasurable speeds. It is through the thought that helps to organize these chaotic states, and in this depiction it is in particular to philosophy and science, two of the three modes of thinking for D and G.

Philosophy utilizes the plane of immanence to create forms or consistency. We have discussed the plane of immanence before in class, but to clarify the plane of immanence “cuts through the chaos, selects infinites movements of thought and is filled with concepts formed like consistent particles going as fast as thought”(118). Philosophy strives to create consistency, “by giving the virtual a consistency specific to it” (118). This is where I was still a little confused in class. What does he mean by consistency? I think this is critical to understanding the plane, yet I am having trouble conceptualizing it and comparing it to the Science.

Verificationism. Also Pragmatism Jumps The Distinction Between Science and Philosophy

Before I get into the meat of my blog there was something I wondered. When hearing about the difference between science and philosophy in class I couldn’t help but draw a connection to Henri Bergson. D&G’s claim that science slows down the infinite in order to gain reference of the virtual is similar to Henri Bergson’s claim. Henri Bergson claimed that science is a system of snapshots throughout an infinite plane. There is a difference between both of these theories though, Bergson argues that these snapshots does not actually completely convey reality because by taking these snapshots they lose the movement that would connect all of the individual snapshots. I was wondering if there was an influence by Bergson on D&G.

That being said I think philosophy loses quite a bit when it completely separates itself from science or from the practical world. Without using the practical world to verify itself, I believe that philosophy becomes victim to the theory of verificationsim. It is an idea that a theory only has meaning if there is some way that one can test it to be true. With things like pragmatism, philosophy can be tested by viewing how it works in the real world; pragmatism would allow itself to be tested by the real world and would not be subject to this problem, other philosophies cannot. This is my problem with D&G they completely separate philosophy from the real world so it cannot be tested, and according to verificationism it would therefore not have any meaning. Without the ability to test itself to see if it is true I can believe anything and be just as justified in it. I can believe there is a giant space turtle out in the universe that eats black holes and craps planets. Without having to subject myself to testing it I would be justified in holding those beliefs. From what I can understand you cannot verify anything that is in that infinite that D&G talk about, because as soon as you stop to test it and relate it with the real world it becomes science, unless you disproved it logically.
You cannot simply create a clear separation between the two when we can see examples of people verifying epistemic beliefs based on their experience of the world. Pragmatism argues that meaning can be found in the practical consequences of accepting that it is true. It is a question of whether our beliefs are consistent with our experiences and other beliefs that we have. For example with pragmatism I can believe that a statement like A=~A is true, as long as I can function in the everyday world and form other beliefs. That is a logical belief completely under the realm of philosophy. Anyone that beliefs quantum mechanics may have to accept that as the case. An example of this being the case would be some sects of Buddhism who can believe stuff like they both exist and don’t exist, or at the essence of everything is nothingness. If this belief turned out not to work in the real world, than we would have to create a new philosophical idea. A pragmatist looks to the real world to see if there philosophical beliefs have basis in the real world.

Pragmatist ethics would rely completely on how it worked in the world. As soon as it stops and looks to see how it works, it becomes science. So to say that philosophy exists on the infinite, and science does not, throws pragmatism out the window every time it tries to relate itself to the world and the experiences that we have.

Pragmatism uses experience of the world as a foundation for beliefs drawing connection for which we can form a belief. I don’t think anyone would argue whether the question of vigilantism is just falls under philosophy, but analyzing how it works practically in the world would be science to D&G. Either pragmatism constantly jumps between philosophy and science every time it verifies itself with experiences of the world or the dividing line drawn by D&G is not there. I may be misunderstanding D&G, but I think that this is a possible objection to the idea that there is a clear separation between science and Philosophy. I might be wrong and only large scale philosophical ideas are philosophy but when applied to the real world it becomes science. Like the idea that we should believe something if it works practically is philosophy, but actually seeing if it works practically is science. But once again that would mean that science changes philosophy. Just the general idea that experiences form all of your beliefs means that a scientific look at the world affects everything in that infinite D&G describe. The theory that experience will define your ethics, your epistemology etc, gray’s that line. Even brand new concepts don’t come out of nowhere, they come from experience.