The Success and Failure of Philosophy

Deleuze and Guattari explain that philosophy presents three elements, “each of which fits with the other two but must be considered for itself:” the prephilosophical plane [philosophy] must lay out, the concepts it must create, and the personae it must invent and bring to life (76). When faced with a philosophical problem, an individual is able to use these activities to gauge the truth value of opposing opinions (79). D and G, however, also explain that philosophy “lives in a permanent crisis” because the relationship between the prephilosophical plane, concepts, and personae, are problematic by nature (82). Each instance is found within the others, but each remains distinct; they “coexist” and “subsist” without disappearing into the other (81). Unlike science, which uses language to discuss the conditions of extensional propositions, philosophy uses language to refer to the conditions to the intensional conditions of consistency. Therefore, even though a concept possesses the ability to serve as a solution to a philosophical problem, it only has meaning in relation to the image of thought it refers to and the conceptual personae it needs. Because the criteria of each of these philosophical activities are found in the others (the “whole” of the problem consists in constructing two when the third is underway), philosophy cannot speak to the “success” or “failure” of a certain solution until the three instances have been established (81). Once these instances are developed, D and G explain that the success or failure of philosophy is determined by categories like “Interesting,” “Remarkable,” and “Important” (82).
Within this specific description, D and G seem to suggest that an individual’s reaction to the inner workings of philosophy directly entails its success or failure. Although the three elements of philosophy (the prephilosophical plane, concepts, and conceptual personae) may work together to properly and effectively determine the truth value of opinions, the “success” of these instances is based on whether or not the individual finds them notably unusual and meaningful. Must philosophy be “interesting,” “remarkable,” and “important” to the philosopher to be successful (and, therefore, to avoid “failure”), or is philosophy still able to flourish in the absence of these characteristics? The development of these philosophical elements is clearly dependent upon the mind of the individual, but it seems as though their construction alone is significant enough for them to stand, even if the individual finds them boring, ordinary, and unimportant. Can philosophy exist at any point on its own, or is it always dependent upon the mind and categories of its creators?