Disciplinary Differences

I am still troubled by D and G's claim that each concept exists on its own distinct plane apart from any other.  This seems to mean that we can never compare concepts side-by-side and determine which one is "better" or "closer to the truth".  Furthermore, it seems to deny us access to anyone else's concepts in the first place.  Where we have been able to say in the past that Bob and Sue agree that Sartre's concept of bad faith is correct, by D and G's estimation we cannot even say that they are talking about the same thing since neither of them has access to the original plane on which Sartre's concept lies.  All that each of them has is their own reconstitution or reactivation of Sartre's concept on their own new planes with their own new ends, distinct from one another.  Yes, these distinct planes intersect at certain points, so Bob and Sue could discuss the merits of one little part of a concept, but the probability of their intersections being large enough that the conversation is even intelligible seems infinitesimally small.  Not only does this make philosophical debate between Bob and Sue nearly impossible, but it also makes any one philosopher's study of past concepts into a subjectively motivated re-interpretation of the past.

What makes all of this so troubling is that it seems to render philosophy as a discipline directionless.  Science is able, by means of its repeatability to establish some ideas as objectively true, to an extent.  In doing so, an entire discipline is able to agree on the truth of some things and the falsity of others, yielding a direction for the entire discipline to move in -- towards further objective truths in the same vein.  Philosophy seems unable to do this.  First of all, our inability to constitute a concept beyond our personal experience of it nullifies our ability to agree on the truth of things.  Without a truth that we can agree upon and know that we hold in common, we are left with each philosopher reactivating parts of old concepts willy-nilly based on their raw appeal to his or her own ends and with no real consideration of their original constitutions (which we cannot access).  If Bob doesn't have the ability to objectively say that Sartre's conception of the purpose of man is more correct than Plato's, then he has no way of setting a bearing towards truth as an individual thinker or a representative of his discipline.

I fully acknowledge the need to ask the meta-questions; the need for philosophy as a necessary underpinning for scientific and artistic issues.  Just as the hammer is a necessary to the driving of a nail, so philosophy is necessary to scientific progress.  The problem that D and G leave us with is one of a mangled and impotent hammer.  The hammer is no less necessary to the nail than before, but the hammer we have is altogether incapable of driving a nail.  While philosophy has a purpose, D and G present us with a framing of philosophical thought which is incapable of accomplishing the very object that it must to accomplish.  I hope that, as the book continues, we are able to rescue philosophy from this sorry state.