Having always been a visual learner, the idea of the concept has been difficult for me to grasp. The reference to abstract ideas or the inability to associate the term concept to other ideas creates a difficulty to fully comprehend what Deleuze and Guattari are proposing. It is becoming clearer and clearer that the only way to obtain or understand this new way of thinking about the concept is to put away the biases that I have always associated to the term. This idea is furthered with the discussion or the failure of communication that has always been associated within philosophy. So far, we have looked at what concepts are according to Deleuze and Guattari. Throughout the book there have been many references or paragraphs that try to reiterate what “a concept is ______.” These depictions are helpful, but overwhelming. To show what a concept is not, science nor art, and its uniqueness to philosophy may help to solidify a better understanding of a concept. I also want to draw attention to the realm of the arts. It is becoming more clear how science is distinctly different from philosophy, but arts seems to have some overlaps within philosophy.
D and G purpose that there are no concepts in the realm of science. This is assumed because, “science extracts prospects (propositions that must not be confused with judgments).” Science utilizes the same components of knowledge, but the concepts that are used are different from that of philosophy. Concepts are not created within the realm of science. They are merely applied as means of showing how nature works in accordance with understanding. This discipline “needs only propositions or functions, whereas philosophy does not invoke a lived that would give only a ghostly and extrinsic life to secondary bloodless concepts.” To further clarify, the “philosophical concept does not refer to the lived, by the way of the compensation, but consists, through its own creation, in setting up an event that surveys the whole of the lived no less than every state of affairs.” The differences of concepts used in philosophy vary from that of the sciences apparent ways which we have discussed throughout class and throughout the book.
Briefly, D and G talk about the arts as being “percepts and affects.” They clarify that by arts they mean visual arts, but also that psychological states such as an existentialist or a true optimist. These are part of they daily affirmations and affect how they perceive the world. It is through this depiction of the arts that being about concern for my understanding of the concept. First, I am confused by how two different realms, visual arts and psychological state, are both placed into the arts. Also, I am confused on how a psychological state would not be a contribution to philosophy. There may be some misunderstanding, but how does a psychological state not contribute to philosophy?
It seems as though a psychological state would apply to the formulation of philosophical concepts only if were think of that formation in terms of a transcendent subject. We have to be careful in reading this text that we do not rely on our prior notions of significant terms like "concept" mean. Concepts come to be by a kind of shifting of conditions that arise in attempts to solve problems. There is no omniscient mover that organizes the concept, however with the art a creator is inherent in the work. Thus psychological states would seems to apply more aptly to that kind of creation rather than the creation of concepts that D and G describe.
ReplyDeleteCharlotte - I'm not sure that D and G would say that art is different because of the role of the creator. I would think that their denial of the unequal relationship between creator and created would extend beyond philosophy, as they have described it.
ReplyDeleteI too am drawn to the defining characteristics of art as that which appeals to percepts and affects. A very close definition will be more desirable here. SImply equating the terms as such, art=percept and affect, belies the intwining nature of philosophy and affect. The way in which these terms apply (i.e. directly, indirectly, intentionally, etc.) to the distinct practice in question is ripe for exposition. That is, the precise relation of art and precept and affect needs to be fleshed out in order to secure its autonomy from philosophy. For instance, it seems that much of moral philosophy is intrinsically correlated to moral sentiments. In our moral practice, much of what it is to be morally responsible is grounded in the affects that overcome us when moral obligations are breached. Such instances need to be explained categorically according to methodology. (i.e, in as far as one engages in moral philosophy, one constructs propositions of which affect is an object, whereas art is a practice in which the object (the oeuvre) actually elicits an affect).
ReplyDeleteI think we consistently try to make the world "make sense" to us when it is actually more disordered. My understanding of the concept is now closer to what I think D and G mean, however their theory is not as cut and clean as we usually like our philosophies to be. I think that D and G's theory is difficult to grasp because it asks us to let go of certain ideas or theories we constant refer to in our daily thinking.
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