Monday, April 25, 2011

McKenna Animal Ethics

Mckenna notion of truth is one that rejects classic notions of truth in favor of a truth that evolves throughout time as the situation changes. Right and wrong has the ability to change based on the context at which it is presented. Her criticism of PETA for attempting to demand a renaming of pets to non-human companions, and her criticism of over humanizing pets demonstrates that there is not a system of laws that can completely protect and articulate animal rights in a moving system. She seems to take a very Aristotelian take on animals ethics arguing that we need to find a mean between the anthropomorphizing animals and the treatment of them as things.
McKenna argued that dogs and cattle have evolved to be of use to humans or at the very least require an interaction with humans to survive. She mentions that dogs are evolved to interact and communicate with humans better than their wolf counterparts and have been used by humans for thousands of years. She uses this to demonstrate that humans as social animals interact with other animals in order to survive, and through this interaction both species evolve to be of use to one another. In fact I would find it hard to believe that cattle could survive for very long without the assistance of humans. I do realize however that while this is an effective argument for not dismissing the use of all animals PETA can still object to McKenna by arguing that humans should stop interacting with new species of animals because they are not evolved in a way to work with humans. This would require us to respect the rights of exotic animals. In addition PETA could also object to McKenna by arguing that our use of animals does more harm and suffering to the animal than it does good. If there is a clear side benefitting at the expense of the other then humans would not be in a community with the animals, the animals are merely being exploited. PETA’s argument against the use of animals is because by nature humans seem to be exploiting these animals. If this is the case then PETA would have a very pragmatic case against McKenna’s position. To this McKenna tries to demonstrate that we need to move back the mean between anthropomorphizing animals and treating animals as things to prevent things like factory farming. This would reduce the exploitation of animals without having to do things like try to rename fish sea kittens (no really PETA tried to). One thing I think is the use of animals is something that is a part of human nature and cannot be escaped. There is no absolute that can be taken to avoid this.
I also find McKenna Feminist pragmatism to be different from many other pragmatists. While most pragmatists would argue that one should find a position that is the most beneficial for all parties McKenna tries to make people change their position as dominant over other species. This would mean that even if we want to help the animals we cannot treat them as things completely because it would eventually defeat the purpose and lead to the further exploitation of the animals.

Saturday, April 23, 2011

Erin McKenna Lecture: The Benefits of the Eco-Feminine Perspective

Professor’s Erin McKenna’s lecture on Thursday addressed the current misconception of human involvement with all other animal. As a devout pragmatist, McKenna used Dewey’s means-end-continuum to show how we can better understand our connection with animals, and how recognizing these commonalities will create an ameliorated animal ethic. McKenna argued that we as human must consider ourselves as part of the “animal kingdom”. Though we as humans have different characteristics from most other animals, we nonetheless fall under the same genus of animals. We should therefore spend less time trying to figure out how animals live, how they can fulfill human ends, and more time figuring out how we (as animals) relate to each other. With this in mind, the more we see ourselves as intertwined with other all animals the less we ought to embrace an over-anthropomorphic view of animals. The problem with sticking to an over-anthropomorphic view of animals is that often elevate ourselves as the dominant animal, which falsely validates why humans can view all other animal “instrumentally”. As an advocate of “pet” ownership, however, McKenna was intent on clarifying how animals cannot be considered as “things”. This approach to animal ethics reinforces the instrumental view of animals as “ends” for humankind. Animals thus become the means for human ends rather than ends in and of themselves.

Last semester I took Prof. Terj’s class on Environmental Ethics. We read a few articles by McKenna; one of which attacking the use if on factory farming and the other an eco-feminine approach to animal ethics. Of course both articles, not to mention her lecture, where motivated by pragmatic understanding of animal ethics. One of the points she reiterated in her lecture was how pragmatist recognize their own fallibility. In general, the pragmatist would dismiss what William James might call “supposed necessities” and use the rule of fallibility helping reshape an undersigning humankind kind. But what I found most appealing in McKenna’s philosophy is how she employs an eco-feminine perspective to animal ethics. The advantage of an eco-feminine perspective helps reassess what we as humans are missing in our approach to animal ethic. The eco-feminist perspective encourages humans to abandon the “dominant”, anthropomorphic view of animals. Instead it appeals to the interest of all animals, which we as humans should embrace as being part of the animal kingdom. Thus, if the eco-famine can indeed teach more about our involvement with animals, it is that our relationships with animals are more intimate and transformative than they are instrumental. Only in abandoning the anthropomorphic view are we as humans then able to consider the needs and interest of all other animals.

Wednesday, April 20, 2011

Erin McKenna Lecture Thoughts

I was a bit confused by Dr. McKenna's ethic, as it seems to undermine itself a bit.  If this is a pragmatic ethic, then the classical notion of truth is ignored in favor of what works in helping people to relate to one another and society better, right?  Well, Dr. McKenna seemed to be saying that we should realize no system of laws or regulations could ever sufficiently stop the ethical violations she's concerned with.  Realistic?  Probably.  But what effect will the acceptance of that truth have on the people attempting to create the laws and regulations?  I think this would probably lead them to accept a certain degree of "inevitable casualties" inherent in an imperfect system, and this seems like a very dangerous slope to slip down.  Pragmatically, wouldn't it be better to just tell people that we can create sufficiently expansive or effective laws, and let them keep trying to better them?  Why should we realize that no laws will ever be good enough?  She says that this will allow opposing sides to work together, but I don't realize how that will necessarily happen.  I may not be understanding her talk, and I definitely don't have a firm grasp of pragmatic thought, but that's one of the problems I saw.

Saturday, April 2, 2011

Missing Something

Here's a section from my paper.  I have a suspicion that I'm missing something obvious here.  If someone sees it, let me know.


 An act’s appropriateness or rightness, rather than being determined by a single factor, relies almost entirely on context in its evaluation.  While consequences may be considered, they are not the exclusive determining factor.  So an act may be considered moral or right if it is done in a right way, for the right reasons, with the right object, at the right time, or perhaps any combination of these or more elements.  Aristotle’s is perhaps the most famous example of a system of this kind.  But what determines the rightness of a certain action in certain circumstances?  I suppose that this could be determined by social codes or subjective notions, but there seems an overarching principle lying behind such possibilities to the effect of, “you should obey social codes, etc.”  But if this is internal to the system, just another social code, as it were, it provides no outside justification for adhering to the system.  A person must therefore, for no moral reason, decide to willingly place herself within the subjective justificatory system.  What sort of reason would she have, then, to perform certain kinds of moral action if not a moral reason?  One could, of course, argue that it is a pragmatic consideration, and that it is simply easier or that it works practically.  Then the ground of the morality of the system is either non-moral, which seems impossible, or morality is defined as that which works best (understood in a practical sense) in a certain situation.  The Stoics are perhaps most closely allied with this view, stating that one should act according to the law of nature.  Things are designed to run smoothly in a certain way, and one should go along with the flow of the universe, in a sense, without resisting.  This is virtue (arĂȘte).

Musings

is paper will consist, broadly, of an exploration of critical race theory in America. In more specific terms, I intent to connect some of the ideas and problems which CR theorists have highlighted as defining the schism which is apparent in the modern, post-enlightenment Western world. In this paper I will attempt to inquire into some of the presuppositions which have helped to shape the underlying assumptions of philosophy and, to a greater extent, modern western society as it has developed. In particular, it would seem fruitful to me to research and explicate on some of the enlightenment thinkers and give context for their opinions and claims.

These critical thinkers were fundamental in shaping various essences which are commonly taken to be the basic properties of humankind. Though it may be a bit difficult to correlate, I would like to move from this to an analysis of racism within the United States specifically. There are, for various reasons, many different misconceptions which have mangled the profound scholarship which came about at this time (the enlightenment) - some of which are perpetuated today. In diagnosing some of the basic assumptions which grew to separate the various groups of people in this time, we can see the bane which still plagues America to this day.

What Does Race Accomplish?

In my paper I want to explore race the idea that it is a social construction. Most of us would agree that race has no biological foundation outside of physical ethnic characteristics. Instead it is a combination of factors that include appearance, ancestry, experience, culture and perceived community membership. Not only does one’s ancestry come into account, but whether one is aware of it and whether the public is aware of it. In one sense, an individual identifies for themselves what community they are a part of; but in another sense, it can be an identity that is pushed on him or her by other people. The race one identifies with can even be different than what the public identifies that person as. Appiah believed that they was no term that could do for us all the things we try to make race do and I think he was right in that assertion. There are numerous factors that go into deciding someone’s race and even considering all these factors together sometimes doesn’t give a clear indication of what race an individual belongs to. In his book Blackness Visible, Charles Mills identifies seven different factors that go into a person’s racial identity and showed how even when you can identify all the factors, a person’s race may still be elusive. I think, like Appiah, that we have made race too broad of a category; including appearance, experience, culture, and ancestry in one is a messy business and leads to much confusion. If the concept of race we identify today is so complex and flawed then why do we even use it still? Most people seem ready to admit that race is flawed yet we do not abandon the system. What do we gain by keeping a system as flawed as this so prominent in our conception society and the world? I think that, for the most part, it leads people to jump to incorrect conclusions and negatively affects how we interact on a day to day basis. While I suppose that there are different communities that make up the larger society, separating people by race only encourages and forces social separations. Even when we find little instances in which our conception of race works out, they are still vastly outweighed by the instances in which racial considerations lead to injustice and inequality.

Friday, April 1, 2011

The Ethics of the Baseball Code

In his book “Philosophy of Sport,” Drew Hyland introduces a wide range of practical and theoretical issues that incorporate sociological, psychological, and philosophical themes. Hyland argues that, alongside politics, religion, music, and the arts, sport should be considered a legitimate subject of philosophical inquiry. The philosophy of sport, in particular, is a relatively new development within the realm of philosophy. Hyland explains that many great philosophers have discussed sport in their works (Plato, Aristotle, and Nietzsche), but that they usually treated sport as an example of a larger point or as a metaphor for a larger issue being addressed (xvi). It wasn’t until the 20th century that philosophers turned their attention directly to sport as a theme for philosophical investigation. Although the philosophy of sport covers a wide variety of topics, including the relationship between sport and society, mind and body in sport, and sport and self knowledge, this area of philosophy places the greatest emphasis on the ethics of sport. Hyland believes that the philosophy of sport must address the issue concerning the “overemphasis on winning” in sport, which elevates with the levels of competition. Unfortunately, competitive sports encourage participants to treat their opponents as “the enemy,” or someone they must dominate. Hyland explains that this type of activity creates alienation between both players and teams, an issue he considers the most significant in sport. Hyland also discusses the issue of drug use within sport, which he believes has a positive correlation with the level of competition.

Because I have participated in baseball throughout my life and on every level short of professional, it is the particular sport I plan to investigate in my term paper. An individual who watches or follows baseball will probably notice that players, coaches, and umpires follow certain rules or guidelines. For example, all players must use some type of protective helmet while at bat and all players on a team must wear uniforms identical in color, trim and style. These types of rules are provided by Major League Baseball and are considered the “written” rules of baseball. If an individual participates in baseball, however, he gains the opportunity to experience an entirely different set of rules. These separate rules are considered the “unwritten” rules of baseball because they are not in the rulebook and are primarily learned through playing the game. The collection of unwritten rules, also known as the baseball “code,” is divided into two categories: the first set is designed to promote sportsmanship (these rules explain when it is appropriate to run, swing, etc.) and the second set is designed to enforce the first set (these rules explain when it is appropriate to throw at a batter, provide a hard tag, etc.). My term paper will investigate the morality of the unwritten rules of baseball using specific virtues provided in Aristotle’s ethics, including courage, fortitude, prudence, justice, and temperance. In order to determine whether or not the activities in baseball are ethical, it is necessary to determine the morality of its players based on varying situations. Because the values of society are reflected in sport, I hope to gain knowledge of these values during my investigation into the ethics of the baseball code.

Saturday, March 26, 2011

Nature and Chaos: One in the Same?

In taking up the subject of philosophical taste as a capacity to judge the beautiful, I find it altogether difficult to part ways from a Kantian perspective. But as the case with almost all of Kant’s philosophy, you’re enticed by his philosophy as much as you are repulsed. Granted his examples (particularly that in art) are meager and lacking in any real substance, but he compensates so well through his thorough explanations that read more scientific than they do philosophical. I don’t mean “scientific” in actual sense, but rather from Kant’s astute, methodical observations of “nature” that characterize his philosophy. The mere fact that he was able to publish three volumes on the subject philosophy is symbolic enough of his immense understanding the human mind. I mean, whether you disagree with him or not, the fact remains how he singlehandedly revolutionized modern philosophy – undoubtedly so, too.

The more I trek through the Third Critique, the more I realize how influential – to an almost inescapable degree – his philosophy has been even amidst those hailed as the more contemporary of thinkers. Such is evidenced is our reading of What is Philosophy by Deleuze and Guattari. The most sticking similarity I’ve come to find between Kantian philosophy and D&G’s distinction between the three modes of thinking lies is found in their respective understanding of art. In particular, the similarity between nature and chaos. For Kant, nature is our apparatus for understanding everything that “exist” in time and space. All things sensible come from nature and our intuitions are a product of nature’s being, more or less, constantly upon us. In application to aesthetics, nature is where we find/discover beauty. The simple pleasures and pains which arise from nature presenting itself to us thus become the basis for our “liking” of beauty and moreover ground the subjectivity of our empirical encounter with nature. What we call beautiful, therefore, derives from our “disinterested” – perhaps better phrased “neutral”—pleasure which nature invokes from us. Our capacity for making this pleasure known is called taste, and everyone has taste. The artist, then, to whom nature has given a certain, ability, skill, or talent (denoted as genius), is the one who can effectively communicate taste through means of nature.

The same is true of the aesthetic figure in art. In art’s struggle with chaos (nature?), at a certain moment it is able to extract from chaos, in the form of a chaoid compound, a pure sensation that is able is capable of standing up on its own. The astonishing similarity I find between Kant’s imagination, where nature presents itself to us via the senses, and D&G’s understanding of art is that way in which both extract from the world private sensations that can be communicated as something universal. In this way chaos and nature are one in the same. They both inexplicably yield sensations to us which that we the capable of communicating to the world via art. Thus, I honestly think you’re right, Austin, the aesthetic figure is to chaos as the genius is to nature. So it seems, at least.

This is Genius: http://www.nowness.com/day/2011/3/18/1371/sebastian--embody

Sunday, March 20, 2011

Religion and Transcendence


Deleuze and Guattari say that philosophy is the creation of concepts on a plane of immanence.  They see philosophy as on a distinct and equal playing field from science and art, but I see the philosophical process as more basic and reject the notion of absolute immanence.  The point that Dr. J made in class about the transcendence of other people was a good one.  An interaction with some sort of transcendence is an everyday thing.  I set up a relationship between science, philosophy, and religion, making a place for transcendence.  In my meta-paper, I suggest that philosophy is the human attempt to understand the world through reason.  But one cannot live on reason alone.  Reason can show us the world, but it cannot get inside of it.  As a child, I was fascinated by opening and closing the refrigerator door.  I would open the door and the light would come on.  I would close the door and the light would turn off.  I always tried to catch a glimpse of the darkened inside of the refrigerator when I closed the door, but I never could, because the door was in the way, and my angle of vision could never get beyond it.  Even if the light went out, it wouldn’t be the same as seeing the inside of the refrigerator with the door closed, clear plastic and cold and darkness.  Science is the same.  It can take things apart, but it can never get inside of them.  We can analyze the brain, but we can never be another person.  We must take the leap of faith to climb the mountain of transcendence.  This is what religion does.  Religion transcends the rational bumping up against things and gets inside of them.  It seeks a direct communication with fundamental reality.  We trust that we know now what lies behind the door.  Science lies alongside philosophy, but religion subsumes it.

Saturday, March 12, 2011

Deleuze and Guattari

Although Deleuze and Guattari present an organized and detailed description of the relationship between the three forms of thought—philosophy, science, and art—a number of questions stem from their characterization of philosophy. According to Deleuze and Guattari, philosophy in its “purest” form is not influenced by the activities that dominate the social arena; contemplation, reflection, and communication are unable to assist the philosopher as (s)he attempts to create the concept. In addition to the philosopher’s detachment from other individuals, Deleuze and Guattari explain that the creation of the concept is a single event that cannot be replicated. Similarly, the plane of immanence, which develops out of an individual’s knowledge of particular concepts and the culmination of his/her own experiences, is specific to each individual. If philosophy requires such independence and is unable to provide consistent events and planes of immanence, how can philosophy contain any amount of objective truth? Deleuze and Guattari explain that only science is concerned with the value of claims and propositions; philosophy searches for solutions to problems, rather than the truth. Should an individual then approach the chaos as a scientist, or would it be more beneficial to search for solutions to the problems that plague society? This description of philosophy directly contrasts with the accurate notion concerning philosophy’s relation to truth: the individuals who participate in philosophy are eventually exposed to objective truth.

The description of the concept that Deleuze and Guattari provide also stimulates a number of questions. After an individual has placed himself in such a position so that the concept is able to “reveal” itself, it is still unclear whether or not (s)he will become the means for the creation of a particular concept. Potentially, an individual could satisfy all of the necessary “requirements” for the creation of a concept without a concept coming even remotely close enough for the individual to grasp. In addition to this problem, the window of opportunity that the individual has to create a concept is limited. Deleuze and Guattari explain that the concept (as a “layer” of the brain subject) is incredibly fragile. Old age creates objective disconnections and disintegrations that prevent individuals from maintaining the infinite speeds of the chaos. Eventually, the concepts that the individual has accumulated throughout his/her lifetime will begin to disintegrate into separate components. Individuals who are near the end of their lives slowly move back into the chaos outside of the plane of immanence and are forced to rely on ready-made opinion (214). Deleuze and Guattari explain that philosophy only comes together in “the moment of grace between life and death” (1). Hence, the philosopher must struggle not only with opinion and chaos, but also with time. How can the individual who aspires to become a philosopher remain optimistic when faced with such an intimidating challenge? Philosophy, then, must be a mode of thought that is available to the individual regardless of his/her specific age.

Philosophies goal should be the pursuit of Logical prospects

Shouldn’t the final goal of philosophy be the formation of opinions. D&G argue that opinions are the enemies of thinking because it does not allow for variation needed for thinking. However once a concept has been thoroughly tested why is it so wrong to try and formulate an opinion. The original idea of philosophy was to find the ideal of truth. Plato’s cave was telling people to find the absolute truth. After escaping the cave the person who saw the truth would try to communicate it with those still stuck in the cave. Granted the people in the cave would not believe him but regardless. The goal of philosophy was to find an absolute truth, one that required no further contemplation. So why can’t one form an opinion? Why can’t one form a concept into a prospect? If one can create a cohesive functional system to shield against the chaos it would seem that they had fulfilled the role of philosophy. At a certain point it seems pointless to continue to contemplate certain philosophical ideas. You would form a logical concept at a certain point so you can contemplate some other philosophical ideal. If the beginnings of philosophy were the pursuit of truth, you cannot make a truth statement if you leave things open ended. The goal of philosophy should be the creation of a set of logical statements that work in a cohesive statement. It should continue to be a pursuit of an absolute truth, or at the very least a truth that shield one from the chaos.

In addition I have a problem with the conceptual personae. It does not seem logical for the character to be completely autonomous. Even Descartes was able to stop the idiot from doubting away everything. The idiot’s goal was to doubt everything. However Descartes was able to prevent the Idiot from doubting away what thinking was, he was able to hang on to opinions that the CP was unable to penetrate. Descartes was able to hang on to conceptions of God and other things to escape his solipsistic hole. The fact that the philosopher could create boundaries makes the cp more of a tool than an autonomous agent. Cp don’t usually take the philosopher just anywhere they are usually at least partially bound by the philosophers already prevalent beliefs. This is why Hegel did not differ that much from Kant, James did not differ that much from Pierce. The conceptual Personae is bound by opinions, thoughts, and beliefs already present in the philosopher. Because of this we do not usually see radical change in philosophic thought all the time. Philosophy usually just builds on top of previous philosophies. There are cases of radical change in philosophy however those cases are rare. I could argue that the philosophers who do cause radical change only do so because they may have experienced something that makes that philosophy inconsistent with some ideas they already hold. So they attempt to create a brand new system. It is like how religion and the idea of God often influence whether or not a philosopher will buy into certain systems.

Saturday, March 5, 2011

appropriation as a facet of becoming in art

Deleuze and Guatarri begin their chapter on art, percept, affect and concept, with a characterization of an artwork frozen in time, independent of "whoever was breathing that day." If philosophy moves at infinite speed and science is a slowing down as to fix points of reference, then art "preserves and is preserved." This preservation is dependent upon the autonomy of the work of art which is made possible only by the viewer who "only experience [the work of art] after." But what is actually preserved is not what one has seen but rather "a bloc of sensations, that is to say, a compound of percepts and affects." The work of art not only instantiates an aesthetic encounter, but offers up an experience that holds long after the encounter has passed. While D & G do not give an account of what makes for good or bad art, in order to properly be identified as artwork, it would have to accomplish this task of preservation.

Thus, the work of art is contingent upon it's physical existence insofar as it is the vehicle by which one may look at and with the artwork. What has happened to the viewer then, is not merely an experience marginalized by it's duration but rather a kind of reminiscence posited by the mind. The combination of the physical thing (whether that be music, visual art, literature or otherwise) with one's aesthetic understanding of the natural world combined with the dramatic intention of the artist will hopefully yield a work that is "a being sensation and nothing else" existing in and of itself. It is the task of the viewer then to further appropriate their feelings about the art encountered in order to create lasting impressions, in a way, feelings that can be conjured in the mind without the presence of the work of art itself. These feelings are called affects and percepts as they are in a way derivative of the visceral affections and perceptions felt upon viewing.

Thus, the task of the work of art both to participate and instantiate a process of appropriation. this appropriation could be of objects, methods, components, feelings, techniques or ideas; but it seems to me that D & G are hinting at a kind territorializing and deterritorializing in order to make the work of art stand alone, in and of itself. This explanation seems to be a surrogate for "appropriation" which, I believe, is inherent to the creative process.