Nature and Chaos: One in the Same?

In taking up the subject of philosophical taste as a capacity to judge the beautiful, I find it altogether difficult to part ways from a Kantian perspective. But as the case with almost all of Kant’s philosophy, you’re enticed by his philosophy as much as you are repulsed. Granted his examples (particularly that in art) are meager and lacking in any real substance, but he compensates so well through his thorough explanations that read more scientific than they do philosophical. I don’t mean “scientific” in actual sense, but rather from Kant’s astute, methodical observations of “nature” that characterize his philosophy. The mere fact that he was able to publish three volumes on the subject philosophy is symbolic enough of his immense understanding the human mind. I mean, whether you disagree with him or not, the fact remains how he singlehandedly revolutionized modern philosophy – undoubtedly so, too.

The more I trek through the Third Critique, the more I realize how influential – to an almost inescapable degree – his philosophy has been even amidst those hailed as the more contemporary of thinkers. Such is evidenced is our reading of What is Philosophy by Deleuze and Guattari. The most sticking similarity I’ve come to find between Kantian philosophy and D&G’s distinction between the three modes of thinking lies is found in their respective understanding of art. In particular, the similarity between nature and chaos. For Kant, nature is our apparatus for understanding everything that “exist” in time and space. All things sensible come from nature and our intuitions are a product of nature’s being, more or less, constantly upon us. In application to aesthetics, nature is where we find/discover beauty. The simple pleasures and pains which arise from nature presenting itself to us thus become the basis for our “liking” of beauty and moreover ground the subjectivity of our empirical encounter with nature. What we call beautiful, therefore, derives from our “disinterested” – perhaps better phrased “neutral”—pleasure which nature invokes from us. Our capacity for making this pleasure known is called taste, and everyone has taste. The artist, then, to whom nature has given a certain, ability, skill, or talent (denoted as genius), is the one who can effectively communicate taste through means of nature.

The same is true of the aesthetic figure in art. In art’s struggle with chaos (nature?), at a certain moment it is able to extract from chaos, in the form of a chaoid compound, a pure sensation that is able is capable of standing up on its own. The astonishing similarity I find between Kant’s imagination, where nature presents itself to us via the senses, and D&G’s understanding of art is that way in which both extract from the world private sensations that can be communicated as something universal. In this way chaos and nature are one in the same. They both inexplicably yield sensations to us which that we the capable of communicating to the world via art. Thus, I honestly think you’re right, Austin, the aesthetic figure is to chaos as the genius is to nature. So it seems, at least.

This is Genius: http://www.nowness.com/day/2011/3/18/1371/sebastian--embody

Religion and Transcendence

Deleuze and Guattari say that philosophy is the creation of concepts on a plane of immanence.  They see philosophy as on a distinct and equal playing field from science and art, but I see the philosophical process as more basic and reject the notion of absolute immanence.  The point that Dr. J made in class about the transcendence of other people was a good one.  An interaction with some sort of transcendence is an everyday thing.  I set up a relationship between science, philosophy, and religion, making a place for transcendence.  In my meta-paper, I suggest that philosophy is the human attempt to understand the world through reason.  But one cannot live on reason alone.  Reason can show us the world, but it cannot get inside of it.  As a child, I was fascinated by opening and closing the refrigerator door.  I would open the door and the light would come on.  I would close the door and the light would turn off.  I always tried to catch a glimpse of the darkened inside of the refrigerator when I closed the door, but I never could, because the door was in the way, and my angle of vision could never get beyond it.  Even if the light went out, it wouldn’t be the same as seeing the inside of the refrigerator with the door closed, clear plastic and cold and darkness.  Science is the same.  It can take things apart, but it can never get inside of them.  We can analyze the brain, but we can never be another person.  We must take the leap of faith to climb the mountain of transcendence.  This is what religion does.  Religion transcends the rational bumping up against things and gets inside of them.  It seeks a direct communication with fundamental reality.  We trust that we know now what lies behind the door.  Science lies alongside philosophy, but religion subsumes it.

Deleuze and Guattari

Although Deleuze and Guattari present an organized and detailed description of the relationship between the three forms of thought—philosophy, science, and art—a number of questions stem from their characterization of philosophy. According to Deleuze and Guattari, philosophy in its “purest” form is not influenced by the activities that dominate the social arena; contemplation, reflection, and communication are unable to assist the philosopher as (s)he attempts to create the concept. In addition to the philosopher’s detachment from other individuals, Deleuze and Guattari explain that the creation of the concept is a single event that cannot be replicated. Similarly, the plane of immanence, which develops out of an individual’s knowledge of particular concepts and the culmination of his/her own experiences, is specific to each individual. If philosophy requires such independence and is unable to provide consistent events and planes of immanence, how can philosophy contain any amount of objective truth? Deleuze and Guattari explain that only science is concerned with the value of claims and propositions; philosophy searches for solutions to problems, rather than the truth. Should an individual then approach the chaos as a scientist, or would it be more beneficial to search for solutions to the problems that plague society? This description of philosophy directly contrasts with the accurate notion concerning philosophy’s relation to truth: the individuals who participate in philosophy are eventually exposed to objective truth.

The description of the concept that Deleuze and Guattari provide also stimulates a number of questions. After an individual has placed himself in such a position so that the concept is able to “reveal” itself, it is still unclear whether or not (s)he will become the means for the creation of a particular concept. Potentially, an individual could satisfy all of the necessary “requirements” for the creation of a concept without a concept coming even remotely close enough for the individual to grasp. In addition to this problem, the window of opportunity that the individual has to create a concept is limited. Deleuze and Guattari explain that the concept (as a “layer” of the brain subject) is incredibly fragile. Old age creates objective disconnections and disintegrations that prevent individuals from maintaining the infinite speeds of the chaos. Eventually, the concepts that the individual has accumulated throughout his/her lifetime will begin to disintegrate into separate components. Individuals who are near the end of their lives slowly move back into the chaos outside of the plane of immanence and are forced to rely on ready-made opinion (214). Deleuze and Guattari explain that philosophy only comes together in “the moment of grace between life and death” (1). Hence, the philosopher must struggle not only with opinion and chaos, but also with time. How can the individual who aspires to become a philosopher remain optimistic when faced with such an intimidating challenge? Philosophy, then, must be a mode of thought that is available to the individual regardless of his/her specific age.

Philosophies goal should be the pursuit of Logical prospects

Shouldn’t the final goal of philosophy be the formation of opinions. D&G argue that opinions are the enemies of thinking because it does not allow for variation needed for thinking. However once a concept has been thoroughly tested why is it so wrong to try and formulate an opinion. The original idea of philosophy was to find the ideal of truth. Plato’s cave was telling people to find the absolute truth. After escaping the cave the person who saw the truth would try to communicate it with those still stuck in the cave. Granted the people in the cave would not believe him but regardless. The goal of philosophy was to find an absolute truth, one that required no further contemplation. So why can’t one form an opinion? Why can’t one form a concept into a prospect? If one can create a cohesive functional system to shield against the chaos it would seem that they had fulfilled the role of philosophy. At a certain point it seems pointless to continue to contemplate certain philosophical ideas. You would form a logical concept at a certain point so you can contemplate some other philosophical ideal. If the beginnings of philosophy were the pursuit of truth, you cannot make a truth statement if you leave things open ended. The goal of philosophy should be the creation of a set of logical statements that work in a cohesive statement. It should continue to be a pursuit of an absolute truth, or at the very least a truth that shield one from the chaos.

In addition I have a problem with the conceptual personae. It does not seem logical for the character to be completely autonomous. Even Descartes was able to stop the idiot from doubting away everything. The idiot’s goal was to doubt everything. However Descartes was able to prevent the Idiot from doubting away what thinking was, he was able to hang on to opinions that the CP was unable to penetrate. Descartes was able to hang on to conceptions of God and other things to escape his solipsistic hole. The fact that the philosopher could create boundaries makes the cp more of a tool than an autonomous agent. Cp don’t usually take the philosopher just anywhere they are usually at least partially bound by the philosophers already prevalent beliefs. This is why Hegel did not differ that much from Kant, James did not differ that much from Pierce. The conceptual Personae is bound by opinions, thoughts, and beliefs already present in the philosopher. Because of this we do not usually see radical change in philosophic thought all the time. Philosophy usually just builds on top of previous philosophies. There are cases of radical change in philosophy however those cases are rare. I could argue that the philosophers who do cause radical change only do so because they may have experienced something that makes that philosophy inconsistent with some ideas they already hold. So they attempt to create a brand new system. It is like how religion and the idea of God often influence whether or not a philosopher will buy into certain systems.

appropriation as a facet of becoming in art

Deleuze and Guatarri begin their chapter on art, percept, affect and concept, with a characterization of an artwork frozen in time, independent of "whoever was breathing that day." If philosophy moves at infinite speed and science is a slowing down as to fix points of reference, then art "preserves and is preserved." This preservation is dependent upon the autonomy of the work of art which is made possible only by the viewer who "only experience [the work of art] after." But what is actually preserved is not what one has seen but rather "a bloc of sensations, that is to say, a compound of percepts and affects." The work of art not only instantiates an aesthetic encounter, but offers up an experience that holds long after the encounter has passed. While D & G do not give an account of what makes for good or bad art, in order to properly be identified as artwork, it would have to accomplish this task of preservation.

Thus, the work of art is contingent upon it's physical existence insofar as it is the vehicle by which one may look at and with the artwork. What has happened to the viewer then, is not merely an experience marginalized by it's duration but rather a kind of reminiscence posited by the mind. The combination of the physical thing (whether that be music, visual art, literature or otherwise) with one's aesthetic understanding of the natural world combined with the dramatic intention of the artist will hopefully yield a work that is "a being sensation and nothing else" existing in and of itself. It is the task of the viewer then to further appropriate their feelings about the art encountered in order to create lasting impressions, in a way, feelings that can be conjured in the mind without the presence of the work of art itself. These feelings are called affects and percepts as they are in a way derivative of the visceral affections and perceptions felt upon viewing.

Thus, the task of the work of art both to participate and instantiate a process of appropriation. this appropriation could be of objects, methods, components, feelings, techniques or ideas; but it seems to me that D & G are hinting at a kind territorializing and deterritorializing in order to make the work of art stand alone, in and of itself. This explanation seems to be a surrogate for "appropriation" which, I believe, is inherent to the creative process.

Paris Je T'aime

Upon reading chapter 7 of What is Philosophy I must say that D&G’s discussion of art is in many regards more fulfilling than even their previous chapters on philosophy and science. While philosophy and science helps “reconceptualize” our understanding of concepts and functions, art helps make sense of human emotion/sensation through the lens of percepts and affects. It is interesting to me how D&G seem to devote closer attention to the subject of art in particular than they do P&S.

Now, obviously they spend more time in the text tackling the differences between philosophy and science, so what I mean to say is how the definition and explication of art that they impart the reader is one that is highly refined. Perhaps it’s the nature of the apparent bias (and I don’t use this word in a pejorative sense) the French have towards art that inspired the rich content of D&G’s own understanding of art. Consequently, I’m more inclined to think of D&G as authorities on art more so than philosophy (all doctorates and publications aside). I mean, lets face it, Memphis is not Paris; and neither is New York City (sorry Kip and Ben), so it makes sense how D&G conception of art is almost inextricable from their own upbringing.

If you think about it, Paris is one of the few cities in the world that is simply exudes art. It leaves one feeling the rawness of human passion and emotion, incomparable to that of any other place on earth. Its almost like the city itself can be characterized by the same qualities of D&G’s own definition of art, as a constant “being of sensation and nothing else” (164). If you can imagine growing up in a city which itself can be defined as a “compound of percepts and affects” it makes sense to view art in a similar manner to that of D&G. Needless to say, my suggestion of Paris as more or less a personification of art helps make sense of the qualities D&G assign to art (at least id like to think so).

When thinking of the “artist’s greatest difficulty” in making art something that can “stand up on its own” this task can seem daunting. Yet possessing the ability to make art “stand up on its own” is integral to art as the artist can only accomplishes this task by ultimately composing art that goes beyond the “lived”. As D&G write, “In each case style is needed—the writer’s syntax, the musician’s modes and rhythms, the painter’s lines and colors—to raise lived perceptions to the precept and lived affections to the affect” (170). For me, D&G’s chapter on art provides an highly relevant interpretation that bounds art to its creative purposes while validating art all the while as a “bloc of sensations” that supersedes the “lived”.

Methods of Autonomy in Art

Percepts and Affects are born out of perceptions and affections, but unlike the philosophical concept, they preserve themselves apart from their origins. They solidify apart from their beginnings in the raw materials of the art work—color, line, shadow, light. From these they stand up, autonomous, preserve themselves such that they remain even while materials fade away. What more can we say about this process of becoming? Setting aside its nature (i.e. an expression of otherness, a realization of the non-human vague via collapse of the boundary between human subject and other), can we elaborate on the means by which such a nature is attained?

D and G relate three monumental types, three distinct patterns in which sensations stand up as monuments, as autonomous blocs. In each, a single sensation or two display movement of harmony such that they are preserved as percept and affect. The first is vibration, a single sensation that rises and falls, displays differences of level. This sensation is in no way cerebral, but it is rather nervous. The second is the embrace or the clinch, two distinct sensations that resonate so closely as to embrace tightly in a clinch, to seem to become bound by one another, though perhaps still remaining distinct. The Third is withdrawal, division or distention, two sensations that at first seems to be proximal but then draw apart.

What can we make of these descriptions? The latter two suggest that the specific interplay between sensations is what can render the work a genuine piece of art. This seems intuitively true. Often what works particularly well in a piece is contrasting emotions it evokes, such as the juxtaposition of contrasting sentiments in a novel. A satire, e.g., Voltaire’s Candide, can produce in one a pure delight in the piece’s caustic wit, yet this sensation will rely on, be closely intertwined with the painted perception of an impure, sordid philosophy, mocked throughout the interactions of a motley mix of juxtaposed characters (e.g., the naïve/the deceiving, the innocent/the underhanded manipulator, etc.). Here, distinct sensations seem to come together, revealing themselves as much more closely bound than one might originally suspect. The reverse can be equally effective. One of Damien Hirst’s sharks in formaldehyde seems to produce fission rather than fusion. The perceived strength of the deadly predator seems to split into two, as the predator and viewer at once become the prey, i.e., objects of death, as strength falls the inevitable victim of weakness, not merely one of contingent life but of the comprehension of one’s invariable end. The strength and the deadly starkly divides.

What of the first type though? A single sensation that functions not by means of interaction but by solitary movement of level. I’d like to here more said on this if it spoke to anyone.

The Event

I’m still having a little trouble wrapping my head around “the event”, which is funny considering my précis was supposed to explain it. I find I can only describe it using the same words as Deleuze and Guattari; according to them the event “is not part of the eternal, but neither is it part of time—it belongs to becoming.” (158) So basically the event is non- temporal, which is contrary to how we might usually think of an event, however it is part of the birth or becoming of…what? It would seem the event itself, as it is the event that exists between instances, not time. Since the event is no longer temporal, it is a meanwhile, which is to say it has a certain permanence. But all these meanwhiles are put on top of each other and are in zone of indescernibility where they can’t be separated. This is all fine and good I suppose, however later D&G write, “Nothing happens there, but everything becomes, so that the event has the privilege of beginning again when time is past. Nothing happens, and yet everything changes, because becoming continues to pass through its components again and to restore the event that is actualized elsewhere, at a different moment.” (158) Now what in the world are they trying to say here? I have an inkling to what it is; possibly trying to explain how the event can become and yet never change, however this just seems flawed. The idea that nothing happens and everything changes seems like an “A = -A” argument. Later they go on to say the concept that apprehends the event. I suppose it is the concept that links the event to others like it, but D&G don’t say that. They seem to assert that every event of a type are the same event. I understand that we have to try to comprehend D&G within their own system but there gets a point at which it seems I have no choice but to agree with them otherwise their system doesn’t work for me. I don’t believe that their explanation of the event is a very good argument, and it seems a little bit too abstract. In my mind, they’re trying to force temporal things into a non-temporal system. If they had said that each event was individual and temporal and the concept linked together the events of the same type into a “relationship” that was non-temporal, thus making them have a sort of immortality, then I might agree with them, especially cause I bet they would be better at describing it than me. But they don't.

On Chapter 7

Artistic works have a unique ability to become completely independent of the bodies and materials which compose them – and in doing so elevate the power of the work at hand to the level of pure sensation. This transcendent bloc of sensations is completely independent of its creator, instead having been formed through self-preservation of the sensations which arose from the original piece of art. Deleuze and Guattari posit an interesting series of steps for this artistic process, which we shall briefly examine here. First, there must be an artist in whose mind the model of the art to be created is held. The artist must also choose the materials with which the work must be created – not simply the physical materials (clay, paper, etc), but also the perceptions and affections which the artist wishes to relay or manipulate. This pool of materials somehow coalesces into a piece of work which has its own essence, conveyed through the perceptions and affections which are a part of the work. These feelings which are evoked by the work are somehow imbued with a quality which allows them to transcend the physical, material level of the world. Thus, the essential characteristic of the work becomes its transcendent quality, and the perception and affection which first regaled the audience has risen to become an independent, preserved quality. Perceptions become percepts; affections become affects. These are the timeless qualities of art which help it achieve its autonomous state, instead of a dependent state of affectation for the audience of the work.

The result which attains is that the percept and affect are able to preserve the essential qualities of the art through transcendence of the material bodies which compose it (e.g. the ink on the pages of a book, the canvas of a painting). This is because the artwork focuses and posits the key qualities of the piece as being within the artwork itself, thus wresting the power of creation from creator and bestowing it eternally to that which has been created. Thus, Art consists in freezing time, capturing a moment of sensation which is able to transcend the physical features of the artwork itself. This is an interesting juxtaposition with philosophy, which attempts to constantly relate and compare concepts whilst constantly changing the boundaries and internal connections of the concept so as to make it compatible with itself and those concepts around it.